NOTES
DISCRIMINATORY DISCIPLINE OF UNION
REPRESENTATIVES FOR BREACH OF
THEIR "HIGHER DUTY" IN
ILLEGAL STRIKES
Remedies for illegal work stoppages are so unsatisfactory and
counterproductive that Justice Powell once declared the aftermath of
an illegal strike "a lawless vacuum." 1 Although an employer may
summarily discharge or suspend all participants in an illegal strike,2 the
cost in lost production time may easily outweigh the benefit of strike
deterrence.3 Therefore, the employer may choose to discipline, or to
discipline more severely, only employees who are the union
representatives 4 of the rebellious work group.
At first glance, this selective punishment of union representatives
appears to contravene sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 5 which prohibit discriminatory
I. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 423 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring in
part & in the judgment).
2. See infra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
a large wildcat strike, wholesale discharges are not practical because an employer
3. "[I]n
cannot terminate all or most of his labor force without crippling production." Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 421 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring in part & in the judgment).
See infra note 15. 4ccord L. STESSIN, EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE 211 (1960); Levy, LegalResponsesto
Rank-And-File Dissent: Restrictions on Union OfficerAutonomy, 30 BUFFALO L. REV. 663, 707-08
(1982). The cost of disciplining a small work group may also be prohibitive; for example, the
company may need the group's product to fill a special order on time when replacement products
or workers are unavailable. See J.KUHN, BARGAINING IN GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT 102 (1961).
4. See Levy, supra note 3, at 708.
The term "union representative" as used in this note includes union officers, stewards, and
committeemen.
5. These subsections provide:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) and (3) (1976).
The employer violates subsection (3) if he selectively punishes the union representative on the
basis of his union status. See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. Conduct that violates
subsection (3) also violates subsection (I) by implication because union membership is a right
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discipline based solely on union status. Employers, however, justify the
harsher punishment of union representatives by asserting either that as
the leader of the work group, the union representative implicitly led the
strike, or that the union representative had, and breached, an
affirmative duty to dissuade the illegal strikers. In either case, the

representative is presumed to have a higher duty than the rank-andfile, and the harsher punishment is supposedly not barred by sections

8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the NLRA because it is not based on the
representative's union status per se, but on his breach of the higher

responsibility that status confers.
This note explores several possible bases of the union
representative's alleged higher duty in an illegal strike and traces the

movement of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) away from
a theory of responsibility predicated on the union representative's

status.6 The note then examines the recent decisions of several federal
circuit courts which, like the NLRB, first adopted and then rejected a
status-based theory of responsibility. 7 These courts now endorse, to

varying degrees, an analysis that identifies the collective bargaining
agreement as the source of the representative's higher duty in the
context of an illegal strike. The note discusses the advantages of this
trend and encourages a more complete adoption of the contract-based

theory of responsibility;8 however, it cautions that undue reliance on an
arbitrator's construction of the contract can lead to an unwarranted
revitalization of the status-based theory.9
I.

PREDICATION OF THE REPRESENTATIVE'S HIGHER DUTY ON

His

UNION STATUS

Concerted activity without union approval is inconsistent with exclusive representation ° and is unprotected by the NLRA. Therefore,
guaranteed by section 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). The Seventh Circuit terms this a
"derivative violation" of subsection (1) and has held that the same facts prove violations of subsections (1) and (3) in such a case. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 227, 229 n.2
(7th Cir. 1979). See R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 132 (1976).
6. See infra notes 20-59 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 60-143 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has recently granted
certiorari on one of these cases, Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1981),
cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982).
8. See infra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 151-84 and accompanying text.
10. R. GORMAN, supra note 5, at 307-08. In Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S.
678 (1944), the Court held that an employer who negotiated directly with the employees and
ignored the union contravened "the essential principle of collective bargaining," id. at 684, and
violated sections 8(a)(l), 8(a)(5), and 9(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1),"158(a)(5) & 159(a)
(1976), by interfering with protected rights, refusing to bargain with the union, and failing to
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the employer may discipline or discharge wildcat strikers t' without
committing an unfair labor practice. 12 In addition, many collective bargaining agreements contain a no-strike clause' 3 that "establishes a rule
of conduct or condition of employment the violation of which by emacknowledge the union as the exclusive representative of the employees. 321 U.S. at 683-84, 687.
See Emporium Capwell Co. v. West Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 67-69 (1975).
11. A "wildcat" strike is a strike by unionized employees without union authorization. R.
GORMAN, supra note 5, at 307. "Quickie" walkouts, sickouts, and slowdowns may also be unauthorized work stoppages, but they usually are ofshorter duration, or involve fewer workers, than a
full-scale wildcat strike.
12. See, e.g., NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199, 202 (4th Cir. 1944). If the employees
were not unionized, however, their concerted activity would be protected under section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C § 157 (1976). See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co.,
370 U.S. 9, 14-15 (1962).
In the 1960s, there was some indication that a wildcat strike in support of an established
union policy would be considered protected activity. See NLRB v. R.C. Can Co., 328 F.2d 974
(5th Cir. 1964). In such a case, the principle of exclusive representation is not violated because the
wildcat strikers are in harmony with union objectives. Id. at 979. The Fifth Circuit repudiated
KC.Can in NLRB v. Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 430 F.2d 786, 790-91 (5th Cir. 1970), and the
Supreme Court unequivocally rejected the theory in Emporium Capwell Co. v. West Addition
Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 67-69 (1975) (unauthorized picket line to protest employer's racial
discrimination is unprotected despite union antidiscrimination policy). See R. GORMAN, supra
note 5, at 307-10.
13. For an example of a no-strike clause, see infra note 131. A no-strike clause is typically the
quid pro quo for an arbitration clause. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 418
(1981) (Powell, J., concurring in part & in the judgment); Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 407 (1976); Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 248
(1970); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960); Textile Workers v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957). The union gives up its right to call a strike or other work
stoppage during the term of the agreement, but the loss of this traditional means of protesting
unfair labor practices is compensated by the union's power to force the employer to arbitrate
grievances.
Courts and the NLRB will infer the existence of a no-strike clause if the collective bargaining
agreement contains an arbitration clause. See Consolidation Coal Co., 263 N.L.R.B. No. 188, at
47-48 (1982) (Member Hunter, dissenting). If a no-strike clause were not inferred, the employer
would not receive his due in return for his promise to arbitrate. See, e.g., Buffalo Forge Co. v.
United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 407 (1976); Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 382
(1974); International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105 (1962);
Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. UMW, 436 F.2d 551, 554-55 (6th Cir. 1970) (court infers no-strike
clause even where contract did not characterize arbitration as "exclusive" means of settling disputes), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 930 (1971); J.P. Wetherby Constr. Corp., 182 N.L.R.B. 690, 696-97
(1970) (opinion of trial examiner, affirmed by Board).
The parties to a collective bargaining agreement may contract out of an implied no-strike
clause, but the Supreme Court has ruled that "[aibsent an explicit expression of such an intention,
however, the agreement to arbitrate and the duty not to strike should be construed as having
coterminous application." Gateway Coal, 414 U.S. at 382. The repeal of a no-strike clause in an
earlier agreement does not suffice to prevent courts from finding an implied duty not to strike;
courts have held that in such circumstances a strike over an arbitrable dispute breaches the collective bargaining agreement. See Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Local 1487, UMW, 457 F.2d 162, 164 (7th
Cir. 1972); Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 259 F.2d 346, 351 (6th Cir. 1958), modfed, 361 U.S. 459
(1960).
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ployees justifies discipline or discharge."1 4 In the exercise of its broad

discretionary power to discipline employees who breach the no-strike
clause, the employer may choose not to discipline anyone or to discipline only select participants. 15 Presumably, however, section 8(a)(3)

some limitation on whom the employer may
of the NLRA 16 imposes
17
choose to punish.

In a typical case, a union representative whose work group has
staged an illegal work stoppage is either the only participant punished
for the group's activity, or is punished more severely than other participants. The representative alleges that the employer has discriminated
against him based on his union status in violation of sections 8(a)(1)

and (3) of the NLRA, 18 and the employer claims that the representative's higher responsibility in the face of an illegal strike justifies his
harsher punishment. In its frequent efforts during the past thirty years
to resolve this issue, the NLRB has explored several possible bases for
the union representative's alleged higher responsibility. 1 9
14. Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 246 (1962). See Mastro Plastics Corp. v.
NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 280 (1956); NLRB v. Rockaway News Co., 345 U.S. 71, 80 (1953); NLRB v.
Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 344 (1939); Gould, Inc. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 728, 732 (3d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980); Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 491 F.2d 388, 395 (3d Cir.

1974).
15. See, e.g., Consolidation Coal Co., 263 N.L.R.B. No. 188, at 6 (1982); Miller Brewing Co.,
254 N.L.R.B. 266, 267 (1981) (opinion of administrative law judge, affirmed by Board); Rogate
Indus., Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 898, 898-99 (1979); Gould Corp., 237 N.L.R.B. 881, 882 (1978) (Member Truesdale, concurring in part & dissenting in part), enforcement denied, 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir.
1979), cert. denied,449 U.S. 890 (1980); Chrysler Corp., Dodge Truck Plant, 232 N.L.R.B. 466, 474
(1977) (opinion of administrative law judge, affirmed by Board); J.P. Wetherby Constr. Corp., 182
N.L.R.B. 690, 697 n.31 (1970). Cf.NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 259
(1939) (company may selectively reemploy illegal strikers).
To the extent that the employer does not discipline any of the participants in a work stoppage,
he condones the illegal activity. This is not uncommon, see I. HOWE & B. WIDDICK, THE UAW
AND WALTER REUTHER 241-42 (1973), perhaps because in certain circumstances the cost of the
work stoppage is less than the cost of punishment (measured in terms of demoralization and lost
manpower). See supra note 3; see also Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 478, 481 (3d
Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S.Ct. 2926 (1982); Gould, Inc. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 728, 732 (3d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980); Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 227, 230
(7th Cir. 1979).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
17. As the NLRB stated in Precision Castings Co., 233 N.L.R.B. 183 (1977):
The fact that the disciplined employees participated in an unauthorized strike in breach

of a valid contract provision does not legitimize. . . [the employer's] action in this situation. . . .[The employer's] freedom to discipline anyone remained unfettered so long as
the criteria employed were not union-related. . . .[Dliscrimination directed against an
employee on the basis of his or her holding union office is contrary to the plain meaning
of Section 8(a)(3) and would frustrate the policies of the Act if allowed to stand.
Id at 183-84 (footnote omitted)
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (3) (1976).
19. For an alternative review and analysis of the Board's position, see Rummage, Union Officers and Wildcat Strikes: Freedomfrom DiscriminatoryDiscipline,4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 258, 262-77

(1981). See also Levy, supra note 3, at 711-12 & nn.273-77 (criticism of Rummage's analysis).
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The Theories of Implicit andNegative Leadersho and the

Exchange Theory.
Although it would violate sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the NLRA to
predicate the discriminatory discipline of a representative on his union
status, it is arguably permissible to-discipline more severely a union
representative who fails to discharge some special duty that accrues to

his position. The distinction requires one to walk a narrow line between predication of fault on status and predication of fault on responsibilities that accrue to that status. Nevertheless, the NLRB and
various Board members have repeatedly attempted to perform this difficult gymnastic.

1. Implicit and Negative Leadersho. Before its 1977 decision in
Precision Castings Co. ,20 the NLRB relied on several status-based theo-

ries of responsibility to justify the discriminatory discipline of union
representatives who participate in illegal work stoppages. In some
cases, participation alone justified the discriminatory punishment. 21 In
other cases, the Board has held that because a steward, by virtue of his
position, is the natural leader of his work group, his participation in an
illegal stoppage implies that he led it.22 Although this theory of "implicit leadership" has some historical and empirical support, 23 it does
not warrant an irrebuttable presumptive inference of leadership from
participation. Some illegal work stoppages apparently result from a
20. 233 N.L.R.B. 183 (1977). For a discussion of Precision Castings, see infra text accompanying notes 39-41.
21. See, e.g., Russell Packing Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 194, 196 (1961). The Board upheld the discriminatory discharge of the chief steward in Russell Packing despite the finding that the steward
tried to persuade the employees to return to work. Id. at 197-98.
22. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp., Dodge Truck Plant, 232 N.L.R.B. 466, 475 (1977); Stockham
Pipe Fittings Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 629, 629 (1949),
It is an accepted rule that if a union representative has actually led, organized, or incited an
illegal work stoppage, more severe punishment is warranted and does not violate section 8(a)(3).
See, e.g., Szewczuga v. NLRB, No. 81-1054, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Aug. 17, 1982); Metropolitan
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 478, 482 n.2 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982);
Consolidation Coal Co., 263 N.L.R.B. No. 188, at 11 n.12 (1982); Miller Brewing Co., 254
N.L.R.B. 266, 279 (1981) (opinion of administrative lawjudge, modified by Board); Guy F. Atkinson Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 277, 280 (1980); Armour-Dial, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. 959, 959 (1979), enforcement denied on other grounds, 638 F.2d 51 (8th Cir. 1981).
23. In the early years of unionization, which culminated in the militant unionism of the
1930s, the steward functioned as a sort of field marshal, wielding his power to call a local or sublocal strike. See I. HOWE & B. WIDDICK, supra note 15, at 238; J. KUHN, supra note 3, at 12; S.
PECK, THE RANK-AND-FILE LEADER 31 (1963). There is reason to believe that some stewards
continue to use disruptive tactics to wage what is tantamount to a guerrilla war against management. See, eg., Chrysler Corp., Dodge Truck Plant, 232 N.L.R.B. 466, 475 (1977) (opinion of
administrative law judge, affirmed by Board) (steward engaged in "labor relations brinksmanship"); N. CHAMBERLAIN, LABOR 250 (1958); J. KUHN, supra note 3, at 50-53; D. MILLER & W.
FORuM, INDUSTRIAL SOCIOLOGY 397-98, 400 (1951).
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kind of spontaneous combustion of long-smoldering worker discontent,24 and other stoppages are led by "hot-heads" within the rank-andfile. 25 In such cases, it would seem unjustifiable to hold the steward

primarily (or even equally) liable for inciting the strike. Most members
of the Board no longer endorse the theory of implicit leadership, al-

though it echoed for years through the strident dissents of Member
26

Penello.

During the years in which the NLRB endorsed some status-based
theory of responsibility, it nevertheless rejected the arbitration theory
of "negative leadership. ' 27 Under this theory, union representatives
"have an affirmative duty to take steps to see that their constituents live
up to the Union's contractual undertaking," 28 and a representative's

failure to discharge this duty justifies his dismissal. The theory of implicit leadership and the theory of negative leadership both predicate

the union representative's liability for an illegal work stoppage on his
status. There is, however, a significant distinction between the two theories. The theory of implicit leadership exposes the union representative to a greater risk of discipline than the rank-and-file, but only if he
violates the contractual obligation that the no-strike clause explicitly

imposes on all employees. By contrast, the theory of negative leader24. See, eg., J. KUHN, supra note 3, at 39-41; D. MILLER & W. FoPiM, supra note 23, at 387;
Atleson, Work Group Behavior and Wildcat Strikes: The Causes andFunctionsof IndustrialDisobedience, 34 OHIo ST. L.J. 751, 811 (1973). For a general discussion of the causes and dynamics of
wildcat strikes, see A. GOULDNER, WILDCAT STRIKES (1954).
25. See J. KUHN, supra note 3, at 3941.
26. See, e.g., Miller Brewing Co., 254 N.L.R.B. 266,269 (1981) (Member Penello, dissenting);
Metropolitan Edison Co., 252 N.L.R.B. 1030, 1031 (Member Penello, dissenting), enforced, 663
F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1981), cert.granted, 102 S.Ct. 2926 (1982); Babcock & Wilcox Co., 249 N.L.R.B.
739, 741-42 (1980) (Member Penello, dissenting); Midwest Precision Castings Co., 244 N.L.R.B.
597, 600 (1979) (Member Penello, concurring); see also infra note 42. In Midwest Precision the
majority of the Board agreed that the steward's discriminatory discipline was warranted by her
leadership role, but where the majority looked to the steward's specific acts to demonstrate her
leadership, id. at 598, Member Penello found that the steward was the leader of the slowdown "by
the very nature of... [her] position" as steward, id. at 600. For a discussion of Midwest Precision, see infra notes 43-54 and accompanying text.
In their initial decisions on this issue, the Third and Seventh Circuits made passing references
to the theory of implicit leadership, see Gould Inc. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 728, 730 n.2, 732 n.4 (3d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980); Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 227,
231 & n.9 (7th Cir. 1979), but the theory does not survive in their more recent opinions, see
Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S.Ct. 2926
(1982); Hammermill Paper Co. v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1981),petitionfor cert.filed, 50
U.S.L.W. 3703 (U.S. Jan. 1, 1982) (No. 81-1438); C.H. Heist Corp. v. NLRB, 657 F.2d 178 (7th
Cir. 1981).
27. The concept of negative leadership was "developed by the impartial chairman of the
Chrysler-UAW appeals board in a series of arbitration awards which have been issued over the
years." Chrysler Corp., Dodge Truck Plant, 232 N.L.R.B. 466, 470 n.l 1 (1977) (opinion of administrative law judge, affirmed by Board).
28. Id.
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ship imposes an entirely different, affirmative duty on the union representative: he must actively dissuade the illegal strikers even if this
obligation is not mentioned in the collective bargaining agreement. The Board has consistently rejected the theory of negative leadership, even when it endorsed the theory of implicit leadership, because
the former theory imposes "different and greater. . responsibilities"
29
on the union representative than on the rank-and-file.
2. The Exchange Theory. In his dissents to recent Board decisions involving the discriminatory discipline of union representatives
who participate in illegal strikes, Member Penello also relied on an exchange theory to justify predication of a union representative's duty on
his status.30 Certain benefits, notably superseniority, 31 often accrue to
union stewardship. Member Penello reasoned that the steward receives
these benefits32 in exchange for the assumption of duties above those of
the rank-and-file to administer the collective bargaining agreement, including the duty to take affimative steps to enforce the no-strike
clause. 33 Therefore, "an employer can lawfully discipline a union offi29. Chrysler Corp., Dodge Truck Plant, 232 N.L.R.B. 466, 475 n.20 (1977) (opinion of administrative law judge, affirmed by Board). See also Armour-Dial, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. 959, 960 n.7
(1979), enforcement denied, 638 F.2d 51 (8th Cir. 1981).
30. See Bethlehem Steel Corp., 252 N.L.R.B. 982, 982 (1980) (Member Penello, dissenting),
enforcement denied sub nomz Fournelle v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 331 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Metropolitan
Edison Co., 252 N.L.R.B. 1030, 1031 (1980) (Member Penello, dissenting), enforced, 663 F.2d 478
(3d Cir. 1981), cert. granted,102 S.Ct. 2926 (1982). Midwest Precision Castings Co., 244 N.L.RB.
597, 600 (1979) (Member Penello, concurring); Gould Corp., 237 N.L.R.B. 881, 884 (1978) (Member Penello, dissenting), enforcement denied,612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,449 U.S. 890
(1980).
For additional criticism of this theory, see Levy, supra note 3, at 713, 717-18; Rummage,
supra note 19, at 272-73.
31. Superseniority is a special employment status that assures that stewards will not be laid

off before other workers, thereby preventing employers from using economically necessary layoffs
as an opportunity to rid themselves of union activists.
32. Although Member Penello often invoked the "battery of benefits and protections" which
the steward receives, see Gould Corp., 237 N.L.R.B. 881, 884 (1978) (Member Penello, dissenting)
(emphasis omitted), enforcement denied, 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979), ceri. denied, 449 U.S. 890
(1980), it is not clear what benefits, besides superseniority, are included in that "battery." In
Gould, Member Penello cited two earlier Board decisions which hold that members of a grievance
committee can insult managers during the course ofgrievance negotiations without fear of reprisal
by discharge. Id. at 884 (citing Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 177 N.L.R.B. 322 (1969); Thor
Power Tool Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 1379 (1964)). As another writer has noted, see Levy, supra note 3,
at 717, this benefit or protection is available to all employees, not only union representatives, see
Beltcher Mfg. Corp., 76 N.L.R.B. 526, 527 (1948). Therefore, the steward's so-called battery of
benefits reduces to the grant of superseniority.
33. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 252 N.L.R.B. 982, 982 (1980) (Member, Penello, dissenting), enforcement deniedsub non. Fournelle v. NLRB 670 F.2d 331 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Midwest Precision
Castings Co., 244 N.L.R.B. 597, 600 (1979) (Member Penello, concurring).
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cial more harshly than other employees for participating in an unpro'34
tected strike."
The exchange theory is problematic for several reasons. First, not
all union representatives receive the same benefits. 35 Therefore, proper
application of the exchange theory would require balancing the individual representative's benefits against the action he took to dissuade
illegal strikers; in theory, the fewer benefits he enjoys, the less he is
obligated to do. The exchange theory has never been applied in this
manner, which suggests that its value is more symbolic than legal. This
is not to say that the exchange theory should be taken more seriously;
where feasible, general rules are preferable to such case-by-case, discretionary balancing tests.
Even assuming that the exchange theory is sound, it need not yield
the affirmative duty suggested by Member Penello. It is equally plausible that in exchange for his perquisites of office, the representative has
a duty to handle employee grievances conscientiously and to inform
employees of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Nothing necessitates adding to those responsibilities the duty to take affirmative steps to halt an illegal work stoppage; it is not axiomatic that the
union representative must police the no-strike clause. Furthermore,
even if the union representative were to receive his benefits in exchange
for policing the no-strike clause, the proper remedy for a representative's failure to discharge his duty to dissuade illegal strikers would be
the revocation of his benefits, not suspension or discharge. Any duty to
dissuade under this theory should accrue to the union representative's
status as a representative, not as an employee. Thus, it would be inappropriate under the exchange theory for him to be punished as an em36
ployee for his failure as a union representative.
Finally, the exchange theory presupposes that the union representative receives the so-called "benefits" in exchange for his performing
certain tasks. This is not necessarily so. It is arguable that the "benefits" are not really a form of consideration or payment, but are a necessary precondition for the exercise of union representation. For
example, superseniority makes it more difficult for an employer to discharge a union representative. By securing this protection, the union
saves itself the time and cost necessary to prove that its representative
has been discharged in retaliation for being an active, effective advo34. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 252 N.L.R.B. 982, 982 (1980) (Member Penello, dissenting), enforcement deniedsub nom Fournelle v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 331 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
35. Only forty percent of the union representatives governed by major collective bargaining
agreements enjoy superseniority, the most valuable of the representative's benefits and the one
stressed by Member Penello. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR BULL. No.
2065, CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS 90 (1980).

36. See infra note 152.
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cate of employee rights. In this sense, superseniority is not a benefit
granted by the employer to the representative in return for his obligation to dissuade illegal strikers; rather, it is a concession made by management to a strong union that wishes to increase its efficiency and to
give its representatives the optimal conditions for the exercise of their
37
union responsibilities.
B. The NLRB's Rejection of the Status-Based Theory of
Responsibiliy.
The NLRB's position on discriminatory discipline of union representatives changed suddenly in 1977.38 In Precision Castings CO., 3 9 the
panel held that an employee's stewardship does not warrant his
"be[ing] held to a greater degree of accountability for participating in
the [illegal] strike," because "discrimination directed against an employee on the basis of his or her holding union office is contrary to the
plain meaning of [s]ection 8(a)(3) and would frustrate the policies of
the [NLRA]. ' 40 With this holding, the Board firmly rejected the statusbased theory of responsibility to which it had subscribed since 1949.41
37. See Brief for Respondent at 10 n.5, Hammermill Paper Co. v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 155 (3d
Cir. 198 1),petitionforcert.fled, 50 U.S.L.W. 3703 (U.S. Jan. 1, 1982) (No. 81-1438). In Hammermill, the Board (respondent) argued that superseniority, like time off with pay to handle grievances, is a benefit which is "confined to a legitimate and agreed-upon need . . .[and] clearly
dofes] not justify exposing stewards to a countervailing set of obligations unilaterally devised and
enforced by the employer." ld.
38. Contra Rummage, supra note 19. Rummage argues that the Board has never deviated
from its position that a union representative's status may be taken into consideration in evaluating
whether his behavior warranted more severe discipline. Id at 262, 269, 279. This is the theory of
implicit leadership mentioned above. See supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text. As Rummage realizes, see Rummage, supra note 19, at 280-83, courts have agreed that prior to Precisian
Castings, the Board condoned a status-based theory of responsibility. The same courts agreed
that PrecisionCastings marked a radical change in the Board's position. See, e.g., Gould, Inc. v.
NLRB, 612 F.2d 728, 732 & n.4 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,449 U.S. 890 (1980); Indiana & Mich.
Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 227, 230 (7th Cir. 1979); see also Consolidation Coal Co., 263
N.L.R.B. No. 188, at 39 (1982) (Member Hunter, dissenting). In its more recent decisions, the
Board has continued to follow PrecisionCastings. See, e.g., Consolidation Coal Co., 263 N.L.R.B.
No. 188 (1982); Bethlehem Steel Corp., 252 N.L.R.B. 982 (1980), enforcement denied sub nom.
Fournele v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 331 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Metropolitan Edison Co., 252 N.L.R.B. 1030
(1980), enforced, 663 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S.Ct. 2926 (1982). But see infra
notes 43-54 and accompanying text (discussion of Midwest Precision Castings Co., 244 N.L.R.B.
597 (1979)). For criticism of Rummage's view, see Levy, supra note 3, at 711-12 & nn. 273-77.
39. 233 N.L.R.B. 183 (1977).
40. Id at 184 (footnote omitted).
41. See Gould Corp., 237 N.L.R.B. 881, 886 (1978) (Member Penello, dissenting), enforcement denied, 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980). In its decisions which
followed Precision Castings, the Board tried, unconvincingly, to distinguish its earlier status-based
decisions. See, e.g., Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 237 N.L.R.B. 226, 228 (1978), enforcement denied,
599 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1014 (1980).
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The reorientation was not unanimous.42 In Midwest Precision
Castings Co. ,3 the Board held that the discriminatory discharge of a
steward for her role in a work slowdown did not violate section

8(a)(3), 44 but the Board rendered its "unanimous" decision in four separate opinions (plus a footnote to Member Jenkins's opinion in which
Member Murphy stated her position). The steward in Midwest Precision was discharged because she instructed another employee to slow

down her production rate.45 Member Jenkins, who wrote the opinion
in Midwest Precision, found that the steward had led the slowdown by
commanding an employee to work more slowly and was therefore
outside the protection of section 8(a)(3). 4 6 Member Jenkins distPrecision Castings relied on Pontiac Motors Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 132 N.L.R.B. 413
(1961), which held that a no-strike clause alone does not warrant status-based discipline of union
representatives, id at 415. As Member Truesdale correctly pointed out, however, the union committeeman in PontiacMotors, who was discriminatorily punished for his failure to persuade some
employees to work overtime, did not himself refuse to work; this distinguishes Pontiac Motors
from Precision Castings. 237 N.L.R.B. at 882 (Member Truesdale concurring in part & dissenting
in part). Because the representative did not participate in the work stoppage, PontiacMotors is not
inconsistent with its contemporary, Russell Packing Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 194 (1961), which held that
participation alone is sufficient to expose a union representative to more severe discipline, id at
196. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
42. In the four years between PrecisionCastings and his departure from the Board, Member
Penello issued a steady stream of dissents to protest the Board's current position. See supra note
26 and accompanying text. The most thorough exposition of Member Penello's position appears
in Gould Corp., 237 N.L.R.B. 881, 882-88 (1978) (Member Penello, dissenting), enforcement denied 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980). For detailed criticism of
Member Penello's opinion in Gould, see Rummage, supra note 19, at 270-75.
Member Truesdale, who is also no longer on the Board, was similarly discontented. See, e.g.,
Midwest Precision Castings Co., 244 N.L.R.B. 597, 602 (1979) (Member Truesdale, concurring);
Gould Corp., 237 N.L.R.B. 881, 881-82 (1978) (Member Truesdale, concurring in part & dissenting in part), enforcement denied, 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980).
Member Truesdale had fewer opportunities than Member Penello to voice his dissent because
many of the discriminatory discipline cases were decided by three-member panels of the Board,
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1976), and Member Penello was more frequently part of the panel.
43. 244 N.L.R.B. 597 (1979).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
45. The no-strike clause in the collective bargaining agreement in Midwest Precision included
the customary language forbidding any "strike, boycott or slowdown." 244 N.L.R.B. at 597.
46. The steward defended her action, saying that she had only spoken jokingly, and there
was evidence that many employees had joked frequently about slowing down. 244 N.L.R.B. at
597-98.
The steward's behavior may, however, have been part of a continuous monitoring and regulation by the employees of their co-workers' work-rates. The members of a work group will often
work at the same rate by tacit or explicit agreement; if they did not, faster workers would give
management extra leverage to increase production rates, to the detriment of other workers in the
group. J. KUHN, supra note 3, at 133. If there was such a plan at work in Midwest Precision, it is
not clear that the steward led or organized it; in its inference that the steward led the slowdown,
Member Jenkins's opinion relies on the Board's theory of implicit leadership, see supra notes 2226 and accompanying text.
As the leader of his work group, a steward is caught in a double-bind when the interests of
the work group in maintaining a uniform production rate directly conflict with the interests of
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inguished Precision Castings Co. 47 and Gould Corp.48 by noting that the
stewards in those cases neither instigated nor led the production disruptions. 49 In a footnote to Member Jenkins's opinion, Member Murphy
ambiguously stated that there was no need to *eitherdistinguish or to
follow Precision Castings or Gould because the steward in Midwest Precision engaged in "improper conduct in direct violation of a contrac-

'50
tual clause."
In a concurring opinion, Chairman Fanning distinguished Precision Castings and Gould by suggesting that in those cases an antiunion
animus motivated the discriminatory discipline.51 Chairman Fanning
management and the union as expressed in the collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., J.
KUHN, supra note 3, at 119; A. NASH, THE UNION STEWARD: DUTIES, RIGHTS, AND STATUS 4344 (1977). On the one hand, the steward is a worker and shares his co-workers' interests and
concerns, id at 42; in addition, to retain the allegiance of his constituency, he must comply with,
or at least not actively thwart, their desires. See J. KUHN, supra note 3, at 106. On the other hand,
the steward, as a union representative, must uphold and help implement the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement. See D. MILLER & W. FORM, supra note 23, at 263; A. NASH, supra, at 8-9.
These irreconcilable demands place a steward in an impossible situation: the steward in Midwest
Precision would fall out of favor with her co-workers if she did not help maintain a uniform work
rate and would be fired by her employer if she did. The courts have become increasingly sensitive
to this type of predicament. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
47. 233 N.L.R.B. 183 (1977).
48. 237 N.L.R.B. 881 (1978), enforcement denied, 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 890 (1980). Gould was the first of the line of NLRB decisions following Precision Castings. Precision Castings characterized as a "fundamental axiom of our national labor policy" the
proposition that "an individual cannot be discriminated against because [sic] of his union status."
237 N.L.R.B. at 881.
49. Midwest Precision Castings Co., 244 N.L.R.B. 597, 598 (1979).
50. 244 N.L.R.B. at 598 n.7. Member Murphy did not say what constituted the violation;
because her opinion is appended in a footnote to Member Jenkins's opinion, she may have agreed
with him that the steward's fault lay in her instigation or leadership of the slowdown.
In Armour-Dial, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. 959 (1979), enforcement denied, 638 F.2d 51 (8th Cir.
1981), Member Murphy again explicitly declined to apply Precision Castings and Gould and based
the discriminatory discipline's illegality on the fact that the disciplined union officials did not
participate in the work stoppage. Id. at 961 (Member Murphy, concurring). In Rogate Indus.,
Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 898, 899-900 (1979), Member Murphy concurred with Members Penello and
Truesdale, putting them in the majority and leaving Chairman Fanning and Member Jenkins to
dissent. Again, Member Murphy explicitly refused to apply Precision Castings and Gould. Instead, she based her opinion of the legality of the discriminatory discipline in Rogate on the union
representatives' more active role in the illegal strike and on the fact that some of the more active
rank-and-file participants had also been disciplined. Id. Member Murphy never joined Members
Penello and Truesdale in their call for the overruling of Precision Castings and Gould, but her
extreme reluctance to rely on those decisions, in which she joined, was at best baffling and at worst
an indication that the majority position has always stood on shaky if not eroding ground.
51. Midwest Precision, 244 N.L.R.B. at 599 (Chairman Fanning, concurring). The issue of
possible antiunion animus is part of the established test for violations of section 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) (1976). See infra note 73 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, it is strange that Chairman Fanning should suggest that this line of analysis determined the outcome in Midwest Precision and Gould. Although there was some evidence of hostility in these cases, see, e.g., infra note
84, the Board did not base the section 8(a)(3) violation on those findings.
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also suggested that an employer may predicate discipline upon a union

representative's status "to the extent that status colors the impact of her
action," 52 which sounds like a corollary to the supposedly abandoned
theory of implicit leadership.5 3 Predictably, Members Penello and
Truesdale approved the discriminatory discipline (with Member
Penello invoking the exchange theory and the theory of implicit leadership), found the case to be indistinguishable from Gould, and protested
54
the Board's current position.

The composition of the Board has radically changed in the past
few years, 55 and to date, the present Board has decided only one case
on point. In Consolidation Coal Co.,56 the Board reaffirmed its position
in Precision Castings and in Gould,57 but the stability of this position

may be contingent on the continued presence of Members Fanning and
Jenkins.5 8 Furthermore, although the majority of the Board reached a
consensus that predication of a union representative's duty on his status

violates section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, this rule is subject to varying interpretations, as Midwest Precision illustrates. Finally the Board has

yet to articulate a clear rule as to the circumstances, if any, under which
52. 244 N.L.R.B. at 599 (Chairman Fanning, concurring).
53. According to Rummage's conservative interpretation of Precision Castings, 233 N.L.R.B.
183 (1977), the Board never rejected the theory of implicit leadership. See supra note 38. This
interpretation reconciles Chairman Fanning's opinion with that of Members Jenkins and Murphy.
See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. See also Rummage, supra note 19, at 277.
54. 244 N.L.R.B. at 600-02 (Member Penello, concurring); id at 602 (Member Truesdale,
concurring).
55. Member Murphy left the Board in December, 1979; Members Penello and Truesdale left
in January, 1981. The following people constitute the current membership: Chairman Van de
Water (arrived August, 1981, on a recess appointment); Member Fanning (term expires December, 1982); Member Hunter (arrived August, 1981; term expires in 1985); Member Jenkins (term
expires August, 1983); Member Zimmerman (arrived August, 1980; term expires in 1984).
56. 263 N.L.R.B. No. 188 (1982).
57. Id at 6-8.
58. The terms of both these members will soon expire. See supra note 55.
Member Zimmerman concurred with Members Fanning and Jenkins in Consolidation Coal,
but Chairman Van de Water and Member Hunter dissented. Chairman Van de Water wrote that
"a union official or steward, as a selected union leader, has an affirmative duty to see that employees live up to their contractual commitments." 263 N.L.R.B. No. 188, at 24 (Chairman Van de
Water, dissenting). The Chairman also believes that "[s]hop stewards are the natural leaders of
any work stoppage in which they participate." Id at 30. Chairman Van de Water is thus the heir
to Member Penello's theories of negative and implicit leadership. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text. Member Hunter agrees with the Chairman that union representatives have a
higher duty than the rank-and-file in the context of an illegal work stoppage. See 263 N.L.R.B.
No. 188, at 41, 46, 51-53 (Member Hunter, dissenting). According to Member Hunter, union
representatives have a duty "to abide by and enforce" the no-strike clause, id at 46, and this duty,
which is "inherent in a no-strike clause," id, requires affirmative discouragement of the illegal
strike, by word and by example, id at 54 n.74. Both Chairman Van de Water and Member
Hunter would overrule PrecisionCastings and Gould. 263 N.L.R.B. No. 188 at 24, 33 (Chairman
Van de Water, dissenting); id at 40 n.45 (Member Hunter, dissenting).
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it is permissible for an employer to discipline a union representative
more severely in the aftermath of an illegal work stoppage 9
II.

PREDICATION OF THE REPRESENTATIVE'S HIGHER DUTY ON THE
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT

Several federal courts of appeals have heard cases on the issue of
discriminatory discipline in retaliation for a union representative's role
in an illegal work stoppage.60 In their initial (1979) decisions, the
Courts of Appeals for the Third and Seventh Circuits presented dual
bases for their holdings that the discriminatory discipline did not violate section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. 61 First, the courts applied the estab"lished test for violations of section 8(a)(3), as articulated in NLRB v.
GreatDane Trailers,Inc. ,62 and held that to punish a union representa59. Although the NLRB rejected the status-based theory of responsibility, it has never clearly
acknowledged that there may be a contractual basis for the union representative's duty to dissuade
illegal strikers. In several decisions, the Board explicitly left as an open question whether protection under section 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976), may be waived by a contractual provision
that explicitly requires union representatives to dissuade illegal strikers. See Rogate Indus., Inc.,
246 N.L.R.B. 898, 900 (1979) (Chairman Fanning & Member Jenkins, dissenting); see also Armour-Dial, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. 959, 960 n.8 (1979), enforcement denied, 638 F.2d 51 (8th Cir. 1981);
Pontiac Motors Div., Gen. Motors Corp. 132 N.L.R.B. 413, 415 (1961). On one occasion, the
Board held that a contract explicitly requiring union representatives to take certain affirmative
dissuasive measures in the event of an illegal work stoppage does not legally validate discriminatory discipline for failure to dissuade. Gould Corp., 237 N.L.R. 881, 881 (1978), enforcement denied, 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980). But see NLRB v. South Cent.
Bell Tel. Co., No. 81-4159, slip op. at 57 (5th Cir. Oct. 4, 1982); Fournelle v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 331,
339 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Analogously, the Board has also opposed the enforcement of such
contractual provisions (or enforcement of the no-strike clause) against employees by employer
discipline. See Hammermill Paper Co., 252 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1237 (1980), enforced, 658 F.2d 155
(3d Cir. 198 1),petitionfor cert.filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3703 (U.S. Jan. 1, 1982) (No. 81-1438); Brief for
Respondent at 10, Hammermill Paper Co. v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1981),petitionfor cert.
filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3703 (U.S. Jan. 1, 1982) (No. 81-1438); see also infra note 152. In the Board's
most recent decision on point, Member Fanning explicitly noted that the propriety of a contractual waiver of section 8(a)(3) protection is still an open question. Consolidation Coal Co., 263
N.L.R.B. No. 188, at 16-17 n.18 (1982); see also id at 17 n.19. Member Zimmerman, however,
wrote in support of such a waiver. Id at 21 n.23 (Member Zimmerman, concurring).
For an especially strong argument against the waiver of section 8(a)(3) protection, see Levy,
supra note 3, at 720-25. C.f Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740
(1981) (employees' rights under compensation statute may not be waived by collective bargaining
agreement); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,51-52 (1974) (Title VII rights may not
be waived).
60. See NLRB v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., No. 81-4159, slip op. (5th Cir. Oct. 4, 1982);
Szewczuga v. NLRB, No. 81-1054, slip. op. (D.C. Cir. Aug. 17, 1982); Fournelle v. NLRB, 670
F.2d 331 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1981), cert.
granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982); Hammermill Paper Co. v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1981),
petitionfor cert.filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3703 (U.S. Jan. 1, 1982) (No. 81-1438); C.H. Heist Corp. v.
NLRB, 657 F.2d 178 (7th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Armour-Dial, Inc., 638 F.2d 51 (8th Cir. 1981);
Gould, Inc. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980); Indiana &
Mich. Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1014 (1980).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
62. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
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tive more harshly than the rank-and-file for his role in an illegal strike
is not "inherently destructive" of important employee rights. 63 Second,

the courts held that the more severe punishment was justified by the
union representative's breach of his higher duty64 as derived from a
65
status-based theory of responsibility.
In their more recent (1981) decisions, 66 the Courts of Appeals for

the Third and Seventh Circuits abandoned their explicit reliance on the
Great Dane test, and, paralleling the NLRB's earlier shift of analysis,
departed from the status-based theory of responsibility. 67 These courts

now look to the collective bargaining agreement as the source of the
68
union representative's duty in the context of an illegal strike.
A.

The Great Dane Test/or Discriminationin Violation ofSection

8(a)(3).
The Supreme Court's landmark decision in NLRB v. Great Dane
Trailers, Inc.69 summarized the Court's earlier section 8(a)(3) deci7sions 70 and established the basic test for impermissible discrimination
63. Gould, Inc. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 728, 733 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980);
Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 227, 232 (7th Cir. 1979).
64. Gould, 612 F.2d at 733; Indiana & MielA Elec., 599 F.2d at 230-32.
65. Gould, 612 F.2d at 733; Indiana & Mich. Ele., 599 F.2d at 230-32. Although the Third
Circuit in Gould expressly endorsed the status-based theory, 612 F.2d at 733, it also noted that the
union representative in Gould had a contractual duty to dissuade. Id. See infra notes 104-06 and
accompanying text.
66. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1981), cert.granted, 102 S.Ct.
2926 (1982); Hammermill Paper Co. v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 198 1),petitionfor cert.filed,
50 U.S.L.W. 3703 (U.S. Jan. 1, 1982) (No. 81-1438); C.H. Heist Corp. v. NLRB, 657 F.2d 178 (7th
Cir. 1981).
67. MetropolitanEdiron, 663 F.2d at 481-83; HammermillPaper,658 F.2d at 163; Heist, 657
F.2d at 183. The Third Circuit unequivocally renounced its earlier reliance on a status-based
theory, see infra notes 12640 and accompanying text, but the position of the Seventh Circuit is
more ambiguous, see infra notes 107-25 and accompanying text.
68. Early in 1981, the Eighth Circuit reviewed an NLRB decision involving the discriminatory discipline of union executive committee members for their role in an illegal work stoppage.
NLRB v. Armour-Dial, Inc., 638 F.2d 51 (8th Cir. 1981). Armour-Dial antedated the 1981 decisions by the Third and Seventh Circuits and does not reflect their move away from the Great Dane
test. Instead, Armour-Dialclosely follows the earlier decisions in those circuits.
The most recent cases addressing these issues are: NLRB v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., No.
814159, slip op. (5th Cir. Oct. 4, 1982); Szewczuga v. NLRB, No. 81-1054, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Aug.
17, 1982); Fournelle v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 331 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Although Fournelle purports to
derive the duty to dissuade from the collective bargaining agreement, it implicitly adopts a questionable status-based theory. See infra notes 174-77 and accompanying text. Fournelle, however,
must be read in light of Szewczuga, which clearly supports the contractual theory of responsibility,
see infra text accompanying notes 178-80, as does South Central Bell, see infra note 149 and accompanying text.
69. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
70. These decisions are: American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); NLRB v.
Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
71. In Great Dane, the Court held that the elements of a section 8(a)(3) violation are "dis-
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against union representatives: discriminatory treatment "capable of
discouraging membership in a labor organization" 72 or "motivated by
an antiunion purpose" 73 violates section 8(a)(3). In addition, the Great
Dane Court lightened the complainant's burden of proof by creating a
presumption of antiunion animus in cases in which the employer's conduct is "so 'inherently destructive of employee interests' "74 that it bears
"'its own indicia of intent'." 75 If the employer's conduct is inherently
destructive, a legitimate business purpose for the discrimination may
outweigh its potential harm; 76 but if the detriment to employee rights is
"'comparatively slight,"' a business purpose will always outweigh the
possible injury unless the complainant explicitly proves an antiunion
animus. 77
The Great Dane test is difficult and confusing to apply, 78 and the
lower courts have been left to determine for themselves the meaning of
the phrases "inherently destructive" and "comparatively slight" and to
create a standard of weights for the balancing test.79 Given a legitimate
business justification, the lower courts will generally find a violation of
crimination and a resulting discouragement of union membership." 388 U.S. at 32. See supra
note 5 for the text of section 8(a)(3).
72.. 388 U.S. at 32. "Discouraging membership in a labor organization 'includes discouraging participation in concerted activities. . . such as a legitimate strike.'" Id. (quoting NLRB v.
Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 233 (1963)). Presumably, it also includes discouraging participation in any legitimate union activity, such as being a union representative.
To establish a violation of section 8(a)(3), one need not show that employees have actually
been discouraged from participation in union activities; the resulting discouragement may be inferred from the nature of the employer's conduct. See Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S.
17, 48-52 (1954).
73. 388 U.S. at 33 (citing American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965)). An
antiunion animus taints otherwise lawful conduct. 388 U.S. at 33. For example, discharging an
employee for participating in an illegal strike is lawful, but if the discharge is demonstrably motivated by an antiunion animus, it violates section 8(a)(3). See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373
U.S. 221, 227 (1963).
74. 388 U.S. at 33 (quoting NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 287 (1965)).
75. 388 U.S. at 33 (quoting NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228, 231 (1963)).
Such conduct "carries with it 'unavoidable consequences which the employer not only foresaw but
which he must have intended'.
388 U.S. at 33 (quoting Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. at 228, 231).
76. 388 U.S. at 33.
77. Id. at 34.
78. See Note, HarsherDiscilinefor Union Stewards than Rank-and-FileforParticipationin
IllegalStrike Activity, CHI[-]KENT L. Rav. 1175, 1177-81 (1980).
79. In NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967), the Court clarified somewhat the
GreatDane method of analysis: if the employer's discriminatory conduct has or could have a
discouraging effect on the exercise of employee rights, there is a prima facie violation of section
8(a)(3), but if the employer shows that his discriminatory conduct had a legitimate business purpose, this may outweigh the adverse effect on employee rights. Id. at 378. Neither Great Dane nor
FleetwoodTrailer provide criteria for measuring the degree of harm that the discriminatory conduct might cause. Furthermore, because the companies in Fleetwood Trailer and Great Dane
presented no business justification at all, the Court was spared the difficulty of determining the
degree to which employee rights had been impaired. Even a slight impairment is impermissible if
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section 8(a)(3) if the potential effect of the discriminatory conduct on
protected employee rights is inherently destructive and will generally
allow the discrimination if its potential effects are comparatively slight.
Although no clear rule distinguishes inherently destructive conduct 0

from conduct that has a comparatively slight adverse effect, 8 ' the courts
generally label as inherently destructive any discriminatory conduct

that jeopardizes82 the future exercise of employee rights or penalizes protected activity.
B.

The Courts' Application of the Great Dane Test and the StatusBased Theory of Responsibili&y.

The Courts of Appeals for the Third and Seventh Circuits closely
followed and applied Great Dane in their initial reviews of the NLRB's

decisions on the discriminatory discipline of union representatives who
participate in an illegal work stoppage.8 3 In neither case was an antiunion animus expressly alleged or proved; 84 rather, the issue turned on

the employer offers no justification whatsoever for its discrimination. FleetwoodTrailer, 389 U.S.
at 380; Great Dane, 388 U.S. at 34-35.
80. Discriminatory conduct found to be inherently destructive includes the following: granting vacation benefits only to strikers who returned before the end of a strike, NLRB v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 603 F.2d 610, 617 (7th Cir. 1979); assigning returned strikers undesirable work,
NLRB v. Moore Business Forms, 574 F.2d 835, 842 (5th Cir. 1978); and guaranteeing superseniority to strikebreakers, NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 227 (1963).
81. Conduct found to have a comparatively slight effect on employee rights includes the following: moving an office outside the jurisdiction of the local union, Loomis Courier Serv., Inc. v.
NLRB, 595 F.2d 491, 495, 499 (9th Cir. 1979); discharging a union organizer for good cause,
Waterbury Community Antenna, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 1978); and giving retroactive pay raises only to those strikers who returned to work by a specific date (where the strike
was aimed at obtaining the retroactive raises), Portland Wiliamette Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 1331,
1334 (9th Cir. 1976).
82. See, e.g., Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 553, 559 (8th Cir. 1981);
NLRB v. Haberman Constr. Co., 641 F.2d 351, 359 (5th Cir. 1981); Portland Williamette Co. v.
NLRB, 534 F.2d 1331, 1334 (9th Cir. 1976).
83. See Gould, Inc. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980);
Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1979). For an analysis of the application of Great Dane in Indiana & Mich. Elec., see Note, supra note 78, at 1184-92.
The NLRB has not relied heavily on Great Dane in this type of case, although the Board
sometimes speaks of "inherently destructive conduct," see, e.g., Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 237
N.L.R.B. 226, 229 (1978), enforcement denied, 599 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1979), and the presence or
lack of an "antiunion animus," see, e.g., J.P. Wetherby Constr. Corp., 182 N.L.R.B. 690, 697
(1970) (opinion of trial examiner, affirmed by the Board). See also Consolidation Coal Co., 263
N.L.R.B. No. 188, at 41-46 (1982) (Member Hunter, dissenting) (application of Great Dane to
validate discriminatory discipline in the context of an illegal strike).
84. See, e.g., Indiana & Miclk Elec., 599 F.2d at 230 n.5.
The complainant in Gould also alleged a violation of section 8(a)(4), which provides that "[ilt
shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to discharge or otherwise discriminate
against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this subchapter." 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1976). The steward in Gould made a practice of filing complaints directly with
various adnjinistrative agencies, bypassing the internal dispute-resolution mechanism set up by
the collective bargaining agreement. Although it was within the steward's rights to pursue this
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whether the employer's conduct was inherently destructive of any important employee rights.
In Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. NLRB, 85 five union representatives participated in an illegal strike, although three of the representatives later joined the effort to end the strike. The rank-and-file
participants received a written warning from the employer; 86 the representatives who aided in the resolution of the strike received one-day
suspensions; and the representatives who stayed out received three-day
suspensions. Following Great Dane, the Indiana & Michigan Electric
court recognized that the company's discriminatory conduct might violate section 8(a)(3) despite its valid business justification 87 if it was
"'inherently destructive' of important employee rights."188 The court
ruled, however, that because union representatives have no right to
participate in an illegal strike, no impermissible impairment of their
rights occurs when an employer disciplines them for their participation.89 The court also held that the union representatives had, and
breached, a "greater responsibility" than the rank-and-fie participants
and that this "greater fault" justified their more severe discipline. 90
Thus, the discriminatory discipline of the union representatives was not
inherently destructive of protected rights and did not violate section
8(a)(3).
Soon after the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided
Indiana & Michigan Electric, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit heard Gould, Inc. v. NLB. 91 In Gould, employee unrest over a
course of action, the company fired the steward at least in part in retaliation for this practice.
Gould Corp., 237 N.L.R.B. 881, 881 (1978), enforcement denied, 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980). This may be the evidence of an antiunion animus to which Chairman Fanning refers in Midwest Precision Castings Co., 244 N.L.R.B. 597 (1979) (Chairman Fanning, concurring). See supra note 51 and accompanying text. The Gould court held that the
steward's involvement in the illegal work stoppage warranted his discharge despite the possible
violation of section 8(a)(4). 612 F.2d at 734.
85. 599 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1979).
86. Such a warning becomes part of the employee's record and may be the basis for discharge
if he is disruptive in the future. See, e.g., Hammermill Paper Co. v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 155, 156 (3d
Cir. 1981), petitionfor cert.filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3703 (U.S. Jan. 1, 1982) (No. 81-1438).
87. 599 F.2d at 229-30 & nn.4 & 5. The company's business justification was its need to
enforce the no-strike clause and deter future violations in order to assure uninterrupted electrical
service. Id. at 229-30 n.4.
88. Id. at 229-30.
89. Id at 230; see infra note 94.
90. Id at 232; see id. at 230.
91. 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980). See Note, 49 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 411 (1981) (discussing Gould).
Six months before the Third Circuit's decision in Gould, the District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania, closely following the Seventh Circuit's Indiana & Mich. Elec. opinion,
upheld the discriminatory discharge of a union official who participated in an illegal work stop-
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recently filed grievance culminated in a two-hour work stoppage in violation of the no-strike clause of the collective bargaining agreement.
The steward who filed the grievance was on his coffee break when the
stoppage began, but he refused to return to work or to encourage the
other employees to return. The company discharged the steward; he
was the only employee punished for the illegal work stoppage. In an
opinion that extensively quoted Indiana& Michigan Electric, the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit followed the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit and held that the discriminatory discipline of a union
steward for his participation in an illegal work stoppage did not violate
section 8(a)(3) under the Great Dane test.92 The court reached its decision without mentioning any business justification for the discriminatory discipline; rather, the court held that the steward had, and
breached, a duty "to take positive steps to halt . . . [the] work
'93
stoppage.
The Indiana& Michigan Electric and Gould courts appear to have
had dual bases for concluding that the discriminatory discipline of a
union representative for his role in an illegal work stoppage does not
violate section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. First, the courts applied the Great
Dane test and held that the discriminatory punishment was not inherently destructive of protected employee rights. Second, the courts held
that the union representatives' failure to discharge their higher duty
justified the discriminatory punishment and thereby avoided the alleged violation of section 8(a)(3). These dual holdings appear to be
alternate bases for the courts' conclusions only because the courts do
not articulate the relationship between them. It is the existence of a
higher duty for union representatives that prevents the discriminatory
punishment from being destructive of protected employee rights. 94 To
illustrate by analogy, in the absence of a no-strike clause, punishment
page. Liotta v. National Forge Co., 473 F. Supp. 1139 (W.D. Pa. 1979), rev'dinpart,af'dinpart,
629 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981).
92. Gould, 612 F.2d at 733.
93. Id.
94. The Indiana & Michigan Electric court held that the discriminatory discipline had no
adverse effect on employee rights because the representative had no right to participate in an
illegal strike, 559 F.2d at 230. The Gould court held that the discrimination did not impair the
exercise of any legitimate employee right because it only deterred employees who intended to
participate in illegal work stoppages from becoming union representatives. 612 F.2d at 733. Each
of these holdings is slightly off target. If the effect of the discipline is to discourage representatives

from participating in illegal strikes, it is not inherently destructive of protected rights-the Indiana
& Michigan Electric court was correct in this respect. The Indiana & Michigan Electric court,
however, ignored the possibility that the threat of discriminatory discipline will discourage em-

ployees from becoming union representatives, an important and protected prerogative. The Gould
court did consider this possibility, but apparently concluded that the threat-of discriminatory dis-

cipline would deter only employees who had illicit intentions from becoming union representatives; this summary conclusion seems unfounded.
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of striking employees would violate section 8(a)(3) because it would
discourage participation in protected, legitimate strikes. 95 A no-strike
"proclause removes the employees' former right to strike from the
96
tected" category and justifies punishment of illegal strikers. Similarly, if union representatives are legally subject to higher liability than
the rank-and-fie with regard to illegal strikes, their former right to be
treated the same as rank-and-fie participants is no longer protected,
and discriminatory discipline is justified. This higher liability could

derive from the representative's leadership of the strike,9 7 from his

breach of an affirmative duty to dissuade the illegal strikers, or from an
explicit waiver of his right under section 8(a)(3) not to be punished
98
more severely than the rank-and-fie for his participation in the strike.
Once his greater liability is established, the representative has no right
to be free of selective discipline, and therefore the discrimination is not
inherently destructive of any protected right. Thus, the representative's
higher duty is the necessary prerequisite for the satisfaction of the Great
Dane test.
As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted in retrospect, the Indiana & Michigan Electric court "did not define exactly
what [the union representative's] 'higher responsibility' is or from
whence it arises." 99 The Indiana & Michigan Electric court, however,
cited with approval several of the NLRB decisions that predicate liability on the union representative's implicit leadership of an illegal
strike,1°° and the court did not mention any affirmative duty to dissuade illegal strikers. Therefore, the Indiana & MichiganElectric court
apparently adopted the theory of implicit leadership previously rejected by the NLRB as an impermissible predication of liability on the
union representative's status.' 0 '
In Gould,Inc. v. NLRB, 0 2 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit closely followed Indiana & Michigan Electric, and at first glance
95. See supra note 72.
96. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 22.

98. It is an open question whether the union representatives' right to equal treatment may be
waived. See supra note 59. This section of the note assumes that a waiver can be valid. See
Fournelle v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 331, 339 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
99. C.H. Heist Corp. v. NLRB, 657 F.2d 178, 182 (7th Cir. 1981).
100. See Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 227, 230-31 & n.9 (7th Cir. 1979).

Under the theory of implicit leadership, if a union representative participates in an illegal
strike, he is deemed to have led it. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text. The Board

rejected this theory in 1977. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
101. 599 F.2d at 230-31 & n.9.
102. 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980).
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the analyses are indistinguishable. 10 3 There is, however, an important
factual distinction between Gould and Indiana & Michigan Electric

which renders the Gould opinion highly ambiguous. In addition to the
customary no-strike clause, the collective bargaining agreement in
Gould clearly and explicitly imposed upon the union and its represent-

atives an affirmative duty to take specific steps to dissuade illegal strikers. 104 As a result, in the midst of its strong concurrence with Indiana&

Michigan Electric, the Gould court also held that the union representative was punished more severely than the rank-and-fie participants in
the illegal strike because he breached his contractual obligation to dissuade them.10 5 This suggests a theory different from the status-based
theory of implicit leadership in Indiana & Michigan Electric: in Gould

the union representative's higher responsibility was an affirmative duty
to dissuade illegal strikers, derived not from his status but from the
explicit terms of the collective bargaining agreement.106 Thus the
Gould opinion left unclear which of the two approaches the Court of

Appeals for the Third Circuit would adopt when deciding future discriminatory discipline cases: (1) a status-based theory reminiscent of

the NLRB's repudiated position, which imposes no affirmative duty on
the union representative but exposes him to greater liability than the

rank-and-file for participation in an illegal strike; or (2) a contractbased theory of responsibility, which permits harsher discipline of the
union representative only if he had, and breached, a contractually im-

posed duty to dissuade.
103. The Gould court quotes extensively from Indiana & MichiganElectric and cites with approval the earlier NLRB decisions. See id at 732 & n.4. Gould also appears to endorse the theory
of implicit leadership. See id at 730 n.2.
104. The collective bargaining agreement in Gould required:
In the event of an illegal, unauthorized or uncondoned strike, work stoppage, interruption or impeding of work, the Local and International Union and its officers shall immediately take positive and evident steps to have those involved cease such activity. These
steps shall involve the following:
Within not more than twenty-four (24) hours after the occurrence of any such unauthorized action, the Union, its officers and representatives shall publicly disavow same
by posting a notice on the bulletin boards throughout the plant. The Union, its officers
and representatives shall immediately order its members to return to work, notwithstanding the existence of any wildcat picket line. The Union, its officers and representatives, shall refuse to aid or assist in any way such unauthorized action.
The Union, its officers and representatives, will in good faith, use every reasonable
effort to terminate such unauthorized action.
612 F.2d 728, 730-31 n.3.
105. The court held that the union representative "was disciplined because he participated in
an illegal strike and failed to perform his contractual obligation to take positive steps to halt that
work stoppage." Id. at 733 (emphasis added).
106. This theory resembles the theory of negative leadership in that it imposes an additional,
affirmative duty on the union representative. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. The
theory of negative leadership, however, predicates the duty to dissuade on the representative's
status, whereas the analysis suggested in Gould ties it firmly to the explicit terms of the collective
bargaining agreement.
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The Merger of the Great Dane Test with the Contract-Based

Theory of Responsibility.
1. The Current Position of the Court of Appealsfor the Seventh
Circuit. In C.H. Heist Corp. v. NLRB

t °7

the Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit cited its earlier decision in Indiana& Michigan Electric
for the proposition that discriminatory discipline is not inherently destructive of employee rights if it is based on a breach of the union representative's higher duty,108 but then found that although the union
representative in Heist participated in the illegal strike, he discharged
his duty as a representative by his efforts to dissuade the illegal strikers.' 0 9 Therefore, the court concluded that the more severe discipline

of the representative impermissibly discriminated against him on the
basis of his union status and was inherently destructive of his protected
right to hold office.

10

Following the line of analysis suggested by the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit in Gould,Inc. v. NLRB,II the Heist court looked
to the collective bargaining agreement as the source of the union representative's duty. Unlike the agreement in Gould,1 2 the Heist contract
107. 657 F.2d 178 (7th Cir. 1981).
108. Id at 182 (citing Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 227, 230 (7th Cir. 1979)).
109. 657 F.2d at 183. The Heist court attempted to distinguish Indiana& Michigan Electric on
the facts: the representative in Heist tried from the outset to dissuade the illegal strikers, but the
representatives in Indiana & Michigan Electric "did so only belatedly." Id. Yet the facts in Heist
were not as clear-cut as the court suggested. In Heist, the company posted new seniority lists that
effectively demoted six employees. That night, a group of angry workers went to their steward's
home. Although he counseled them to use the contractually established grievance procedure to
voice their discontent, he had already given them an employee list with which to rally their coworkers for a strike. In fact, the workers used the steward's home phone to make the calls. The
Heist court was sensitive to the steward's need to retain his "credibility and the ability . . . to
mediate a resolution of the strike," and to refrain from taking steps which "would have been
suicidal to his union stewardship." Id. at 182. See infra note 142 and accompanying text. It is not
clear, however, that the steward's legitimate desire to retain the workers' allegiance required him
to furnish them with the means of organizing an illegal strike. These facts blur the Seventh Circuit's distinction between Heist and Indiana & Michigan Electric. In both cases the union representatives participated in an illegal work stoppage, and in both cases they made efforts to dissuade
the rank-and-file. In each case, these efforts were questionable: the dissuasion in Indiana & Michigan Electric was belated, and the dissuasion in Heist was accompanied by assistance in organizing
the illegal strike.
110. Id. at 183. The Heist court also distinguished Indiana& Michigan Electric by noting that
"[w]e emphasize the inherently less destructive suspensions in Indiana & Michigan Electric Co.
from the dischargein the present case." Id. at 182 n.3 (emphasis in original). This distinction is
not helpful: if the discriminatory punishment might discourage employees from becoming union
representatives, it is immaterial whether the adverse effect is caused by the threat of suspension or
the threat of discharge. Perhaps the court meant that a more severe punishment is more discouraging. The magnitude of the discouragement, however, is irrelevant unless the employer offers a
business justification for the discriminatory conduct. See supra note 79.
111. 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980).
112. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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did not impose on union representatives an affirmative duty to dissuade

illegal strikers. Instead, the agreement contained a no-strike clause and
a clause that required union stewards to ensure employee compliance13

with the collective bargaining agreement (a "compliance clause").'

The Heist court found that this was a "tenuous" basis on which to
predicate a higher responsibility for union stewards and concluded that

"[iln the absence of a clear contractual provision requiring [the steward] ... to cross the [illegal] picket line, his efforts [at dissuasion] were

his obligation to
sufficient, if not the most effective possible, to satisfy
''
see that the no-strike clause was complied with. 14
In Heist, the Great Dane test begins to merge into a contract-based

theory of responsibility; discriminatory discipline is permissible under
section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA 115 only if the union representative has

breached his contractually determined duty. This merger does no
harm to the theory behind Great Dane; rather, it facilitates its applica-

tion. The purpose of the Great Dane presumption that certain "'inherently destructive' 116 conduct carries "'its own indicia of [anti-union]
intent' "117 is to relieve the disciplined representative and his union of
the heavy burden of proving that the employer's conduct was motivated by an antiunion animus. In the context of an illegal work stop-

page, this purpose is best served by the presumption that if the union
representative has discharged his duty under the collective bargaining

agreement, an employer's discriminatory punishment of a representative carries all the "indicia of intent" necessary to establish a violation
of section 8(a)(3).
In Heist, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit appeared to
slip effortlessly from its status-based theory of implicit leadership in
Indiana& Michigan Electric Co. v. NLRB1 8 to the contract-based theory suggested by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Gould,
113. The collective bargaining agreement in Heist provided that "The steward's duties shall
consist of seeing that all terms and conditions of the Agreement are being complied with.....
There shall be no strike or lockout, slowdown, interference, or work interruption on any job." 657
F.2d at 181.
114. 657 F.2d at 183. It is arguable that the no-strike clause required the steward (and all

other employees) to cross an illegal picket line, that is, to refuse to participate in an illegal work
stoppage. No doubt what the court means here is that in the absence of a provision requiring
union representatives to take specific affirmative steps in the event of an illegal strike, reasonable
and timely efforts to dissuade suffice to satisfy the compliance clause.
115. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
116. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33 (1967) (quoting NLRB v. Brown, 380
U.S. 278, 287 (1965)).
117. 388 U.S. at 33 (quoting NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228, 231 (1963)).
118. 599 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1979). See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
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Actually, the transition was qualified and incomplete;

Heist does not overrule Indiana & Michigan Electric or repudiate its

status-based theory. Rather, it acknowledges the theory of implicit
leadership 120 and creates an exception to it: leadership of an illegal

strike may not be inferred from a representative's participation in the
strike if he tried from the outset to dissuade the strikers. 12 1 The Heist
court looked to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement to de-

termine the union representative's duty and the legality of his discriminatory discipline, but the agreement in Heist did not impose an
affirmative duty to dissuade. 122 The Heist court did not find that the

union representative had an affirmative duty to dissuade. Rather the
court stated that the representative's efforts at dissuasion discharged his
duty under the compliance clause.123 If a representative participates in
an illegal work stoppage and does not try to dissuade the rank-and-file,
he may still, perhaps, be punished under the Indiana & Michigan Electric/Heist rule as the implicit leader of the strike, regardless of the

terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Thus Heist resembles
Gould in its ambiguity: 124 it is equally compatible with the status-

based theory of implicit leadership and with the theory of contractual
125
responsibility.
119. 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,449 U.S. 890 (1980). See supra notes 104-06 and
accompanying text.
120. Id. at 732-33 (citing Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 227, 231 n.9 (8th Cir.
1979)).
121. Heist, 657 F.2d at 183.
122. Heist suggests that the duty to dissuade might be inferred from the conjunction of a nostrike clause and a compliance clause. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. In Carbon Fuel
Co. v. UMW, 444 U.S. 212 (1979), the Supreme Court held that it is impermissible to infer from
an arbitration clause, which implies a no-strike clause, see supra note 13, or from a clause that
requires the union to "maintain the integrity" of the collective bargaining agreement, that an
international union has an affirmative duty to try to prevent or terminate a local's unauthorized
wildcat strike, 444 U.S. at 216, even though the international and the company could have contracted to impose the affirmative duty. Id. at 220-21. CarbonFuel does not address the question of
a union representative's duty with regard to an illegal strike, but it suggests by analogy that an
affirmative duty to dissuade may not be inferred from a no-strike clause or from a no-strike clause
coupled with a compliance clause, although the duty may be imposed by an explicit contractual
provision. See Levy, supra note 3, at 714 & n.296.
123. Heist, 657 F.2d at 183.
124. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
125. Less than three weeks after its decision in Heist, the Seventh Circuit issued its opinion in
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 1242 (7th Cir. 1981). The Caterpillarcourt held that
Indiana & Michigan Electric controlled the discriminatory discipline question. Id at 1248. In
Caterpillar,union status, with its "incumbent responsibilities to avert and discourage wildcat activities," id at 1245, was one of four criteria for the representatives' dismissal.
Caterpillaris of little precedential value. The court disposes of the discriminatory discipline
question in one paragraph and with no mention of Heist, following Indiana & Michigan Electric as
though Heist had never been decided. (This is especially peculiar because one member of the
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The Current Positionof the Court ofAppealsfor the Third Cir-

cuit. Unlike the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit moved definitively away from the status-

based theory of responsibility after its initial, ambiguous decision in

Gould. In HammermillPaperCo. v. NLRB,126 a decision independent
of but contemporaneous with the decision of the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit in Heist, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
invoked the Great Dane test and held that discriminatory discipline

based solely on a union representative's status might discourage employees from seeking union office and is therefore inherently destruc-

tive of employee rights. 12 7 The Hammermill court found no legitimate
business justification for the discriminatory discipline because the col-

lective bargaining agreement did not require that union representatives
take affirmative steps to dissuade illegal strikers,1 28 a fact that distin1 29
guished the Hammermill contract from the one in Gould.
Unlike the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Heist, the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Hammermill did not hesitate
to repudiate Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. NLRB. 130 The Hammermill court pointed out that because the collective bargaining agreement in Indiana & Michigan Electric barely suggested that stewards
have any duty in regard to illegal work stoppages,13 1 Indiana & Michigan Electric in effect held that employers may "single out for harsher
punishment union officials who merely participate in illegal strikes re32
gardless of the language in their collective bargaining agreements."'1
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explicitly acknowledged
Caterpillarpanel also heard Heist.) Strangely, the Board's motions for rehearing and for rehearing
en banc were denied. See id at 1242.
126. 658 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1981),petitionfor cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3703 (U.S. Jan. 1, 1982)
(No. 81-1438).
127. 658 F.2d at 163.
128. Id. Contrast the holding of the Seventh Circuit in Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. NLRB,
599 F.2d 227, 229 n.4 (7th Cir. 1979), that an employer's need to enforce the no-strike clause is a
legitimate business justification for the discriminatory discipline of union representatives.
129. 658 F.2d at 163. For the text of the contractual provision in Gould, see supra note 104.
130. 599 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1979).
131. The collective bargaining agreement in Indiana& Michigan Electric provided:
[T]he International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers and the Local Union agree that
the employees covered by this Agreement, or any of them will not be called upon or
permitted to cease or abstain from the continuous performance of the duties pertaining
to the positions held by them with the Company in accord with the terms of this
agreement.
Id. at 228.
In C.H. Heist Corp. v. NLRB, 657 F.2d 178 (7th Cir. 1981), the Seventh Circuit recognized
that this provision in the Indiana& MichiganElectric contract was a questionable basis for imposing a higher duty, id. at 182, yet it seemed willing to infer a duty to dissuade from the "even more
tenuous" language of the Heist contract, id., or to predicate that duty on the representative's status. See supra notes 112-14, 122-25 and accompanying text.
132. Hammermill, 658 F.2d at 164.
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that the Indiana & Michigan Electric rule impermissibly predicates a

higher duty, and a correspondingly greater liability, on the union representative's status. 133 The Hammermill court's rejection of the Indiana&
MichiganElectric rule makes clear the decision of the Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit to find a violation of section 8(a)(3) 134 unless the
discriminatory discipline of a union representative for his role in an

illegal work stoppage is predicated on the specific terms of the collec5
tive bargaining agreement.13
A few months after the Hammermill decision, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in MetropolitanEdison Co. v. NLRB 136 confirmed its determination to evaluate the discriminatory discipline of a

union representative in light of the collective bargaining agreement.
On the facts of Metropolitan,137 the Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-

cuit had several options: (1) it could follow the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit in Heist and hold that the twenty-five day suspen-

sions in Metropolitan were less destructive of employee rights than the
discharges in Heist and Gould and the five-month suspension in Hammermill;138 (2) it could limit its holding in Hammermill to the factual

peculiarities of that case; 139 or (3) it could confirm its repudiation of
Indiana & Michigan Electric and examine the union representative's

duties under the collective bargaining agreement. The court chose the
third alternative, unequivocally stating that "[i]f the collective bargain-

ing agreement does not specify that union officials have some responsibility to try to end an illegal work stoppage, then the company may not
133. Id.
134. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
135. In Hammermill, the Third Circuit went much further than necessary, given the facts of
the case. When the work stoppage occurred, the disciplined steward was working as an employee
with a maintenance crew other than the crew for which he was steward. This crew had its own
steward, who was also present when the crew illegally stopped work. The court could have found
that the steward who suffered the discriminatory discipline was, under the circumstances of the
case, not a steward, but a rank-and-file member of the crew. See 658 F.2d at 167 (Higginbotham,
J., concurring). As such, he would have no higher responsibility than other members of the crew,
and there could be no legitimate reason to punish him more severely. Thus the court could have
found a violation of section 8(a)(3) without criticizing Indiana & Michigan Electric, the case on
which it so heavily relied in Gould. Instead, the court declined to follow the status-based theory of
Indiana& MichiganElectric and tied its decision in Gould to the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement.
136. 663 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S.Ct. 2926 (1982).
137. The facts of Metropolitan closely resemble those in Indiana& Michigan Electric. In both
Indiana & Michigan Electric and Metropolitan, the employer was a public utility, and the collective bargaining agreements contained no-strike clauses; therefore, the business justification for the
disciplinary action so heavily relied on in Indiana & Michigan Electric, see jupra note 87, was
available to the employer in Metropolitan.
138. See supra note 110.
139. See supra note 135.
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impose any greater discipline on union officials than on other partici140
pants in the strike."
The court also qualified its earlier holding in Gould. Gould concluded that it is permissible to discourage employees who intend to participate in illegal strikes from becoming union officials;141 Metropolitan
underscored "the limits of that rationale" and held that it is impermissible to allow the discriminatory discipline of union representatives to
"deter others from seeking union office because of the fear that, if an
illegal strike were to occur, they would be put into an untenable position: either obey the company and lose their authority, or follow their
own judgment and risk harsher punishment."' 142 The Metropolitan
court did not rely on the Great Dane test, which was thus merged com43
pletely into the contract-based theory of responsibility.1
D.

The Virtues of the Contract-BasedTheory of Responsibility.

As the court in HammermillPaperCo. v. NLRB 144 pointed out, the
theory of implicit leadership impermissibly predicates liability on the
union representative's status. 145 Therefore, discriminatory discipline in
the absence of an affirmative contractual duty to dissuade, or without
some explicit contractual waiver of the representative's right to be protected from discriminatory discipline, is inherently destructive of protected rights. The contract-based theory of responsibility makes the
"inherently destructive" test for violations of section 8(a)(3) of the
NLRA, 146 as articulated in NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers,Inc. ,147 less
obscure and easier to apply in the context of the discriminatory discipline of a union representative for his role in an illegal work stoppage.
The contractual analysis of a representative's duty provides a simple
general rule by which courts may determine the extent of the representative's responsibility and liability: only if the collective bargaining
agreement specifies that the union representative has an affirmative
duty to dissuade illegal strikers is he liable for any breach of that duty;
if it does not, no liability accrues. The clarity and strictness of the rule
also provide clear-cut guidance for a union representative in the vola140. Metropolitan, 663 F.2d at 482.
141. 612 F.2d at 733. See supra note 94.
142. 663 F.2d at 482 (footnote omitted). Both the Third and the Seventh Circuits have shown
an increasing awareness of the union representative's precarious position during an illegal work
stoppage. Compareid with Heist, 657 F.2d at 183 (union representative not required to take steps
which would be "suicidal" to his union stewardship and to his efficacy as representative).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 115-17.
144. 658 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1981).
145. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
146. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
147. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
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tile and tension-ridden circumstances that surround most illegal
strikes. 148 Furthermore, to the extent that the union representative's
duty remains uncertain and ill-defined, the employer retains the power
unilaterally to create and enforce the representative's higher responsi-

bility. Because important rights are at stake, any imposition of higher
liability ought to be the subject of negotiation between the union and
the employer and ought not occur in the absence of an explicit provision in the collective bargaining agreemeit.
III.

UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS: THE RETURN OF STATUS-BASED
LIABILITY THROUGH THE ARBITRATOR'S CONSTRUCTION
OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT

A comparison of the 1979 and 1981 cases that address the issue of
discriminatory discipline of union representatives who participate in illegal work stoppages shows a clear trend in the Courts of Appeals for
the Third and Seventh Circuits away from a status-based theory of
higher liability for participation and toward a contract-based theory
that imposes liability only if the representative breaches an affirmative
and explicit contractual duty to dissuade. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth 49 and District of Columbia' 50 Circuits have recently joined this
trend. This welcome resolution of the problems inherent in the statusbased theories, however, is not without difficulties of its own. As a 1982
case, Fournelle v. NLRB,15 1 demonstrates, status-based liability can be
resurrected in the guise of a contractual analysis. 52
148. See Consolidation Coal Co., 263 N.L.R.B. No. 188, at 20 (1982) (Member Zimmerman,
concurring) (representatives are entitled to "notice" of their duty and potential liability).
149. See NLRB v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., No. 81-4159, slip op. at 60 (5th Cir. Oct. 4, 1982)
(discriminatory discipline "must be based on clear and specific contractual language").
150. See Szewczuga v. NLRB, No. 81-1054, slip op. at 23 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 17, 1982). For a
discussion of Szewczuga, see infra notes 178-81 and accompanying text.
151. 670 F.2d 331 (D.C. Cir. 1982). For additional criticism of Fournelle, see Levy, supra note
3, at 718-19.
152. Of course, there are many other unresolved and perplexing issues that pertain to the
mechanics of applying the contract-based theory of responsibility. For example, there is a significant problem in determining what actions by a union representative are sufficient to discharge the
duty to dissuade once it is contractually imposed. One Board member has suggested that representatives be held to a "reasonable man" standard of behavior. See Consolidation Coal Co., 263
N.L.R.B. No. 188, at 54 n.74 (1982) (Member Hunter, dissenting). In their most recent decisions,
however, the Third and Seventh Circuits have been sensitive to the precariousness, of the union
representative's position during an illegal strike. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. Both
courts of appeals agree that the representative need only take the steps explicitly required by the
collective bargaining agreement; otherwise, he would lose his authority and credibility in the eyes
of the rank-and-file and so become useless as a mediator. See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB,
663 F.2d 478, 481-82 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982); C.H. Heist Corp. v.
NLRB, 657 F.2d 178, 182-83 (7th Cir. 1981). The Third Circuit, however, noted an exception to
its liberal rule, and held that if a union representative does not discharge his duty to dissuade in
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Congress has long favored arbitration as a means of dispute resolution, 53 and the Supreme Court gave judicial effect to this legislative
policy in the Steelworkers Trilogy154 when it mandated extreme deference to arbitrators' decisions.' 55 The policy of the NLRB with regard
good faith, he is liable to greater punishment. Metropolitan, 663 F.2d at 481. Courts have long
recognized the possibility of covert instigation of illegal strikes by union representatives. See
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 418 n.1 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring in part &
in the judgment); NLRB v. Armour-Dial, Inc., 638 F.2d 51, 56 (8th Cir. 1981); Lewis v. Benedict
Coal Corp., 259 F.2d 346, 352 (6th Cir. 1958); United States v. UMW, 77 F. Supp. 563, 566
(D.D.C. 1948), arfdinpart, appealdismissed inpart, 177 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
871 (1949). The Third Circuit was therefore correct to acknowledge the possibility of bad-faith
dissuasion, a graphic example of which appears in J. KUHN, supra note 3, at 108. Cf Note, 86
HIv. L. Rev. 447, 457 (1972) (evidentiary problem of identifying tacit support of union for
wildcat strike). The difficulty of distinguishing between sincere and insincere dissuasion has led
Chairman Van de Water to infer liability from participation, see Consolidation Coal Co., 263
N.L.R.B. No. 188, at 29-30 (1982) (Chairman Van de Water, dissenting), in an argument that
Members Fanning and Jenkins repudiate as "curbstone psychoanalysis," 236 N.L.R.B. No. 188, at
2 n.2.
Difficult issues largely unaddressed by the courts also surround the presupposition that it is
the employer and not the union that should have the power to punish union representatives who
breach an affirmative contractual duty to dissuade. The NLRB has argued that "the employer's
use ofjob discrimination [i.e., discriminatory discipline] to police stewards' performance as union
representatives misuses the employer-employee relationship [and] intrudes into internal union affairs." Brief for Respondent at 10, Hammermill Paper Co. v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1981),
petitionforcert.fled, 50 U.S.L.W. 3703 (U.S. Jan. 1, 1982) (No. 81-1438); see Metropolitan Edison
Co., 252 N.L.R.B. 1030, 1035 (1980) (opinion of administrative judge, affirmed by Board), enforced, 663 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982); Hammermill Paper Co.,
252 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1237 (1980), enforced, 658 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1981), petitionfor cert.filed, 50
U.S.L.W. 3703 (U.S. Jan. 1, 1982) (No. 81-1438); Gould Corp., 237 N.L.R.B. 881, 881 (1978),
enforced, 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980). As the administrative
judge noted in Metropolitan, the union has no equivalent power to punish management representatives who breach their responsibilities under the collective bargaining agreement, but can only
grieve the breach pursuant to the arbitration clause of the agreement. 252 N.L.R.B. at 1035. A
commentator has also argued persuasively against enforcement by the employer of a contractual
duty to dissuade, which the representative arguably owes to the union, not to the employer. See
Levy, supra note 3, at 715, 724-26.
153. In 1947, Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, tit. II, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 29 U.S.C. (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). Sections 201(c)
and 203(d) of the Act make it clear that a peaceful, contractual dispute-resolution mechanism is
the preferred means of settling grievances. 29 U.S.C. §§ 171(c), 173(d) (1976).
154. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
155. For example, the Court in UnitedSteelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. held that
because the parties bargained for the arbitrator's construction of the collective bargaining agreement, courts may not overrule that construction just because their interpretation of the contract
would differ. 363 U.S. 593, 599. It has been pointed out, however, that the central issue in the
Steelworkers Trilogy was not the NLRB's deference to arbitral awards, but the power of the federal courts to require that arbitration take place. See NLRB v. Pincus Bros., Inc.-Maxwell, 620
F.2d 367, 390 (3d Cir. 1980) (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the Steelworkers Trilogy dealt
with the relationship of the courts, not the Board, to the arbitral process, NLRB v. South Cent.
Bell Tel. Co., No. 81-4159, slip op. at 54 (5th Cir. Oct. 4, 1982), and the Board's attitude towards
arbitral awards may be less deferential than that of the courts because the Board has a congres-
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to deference to arbitral awards has fluctuated wildly, 5 6 and there is

particular confusion in cases in which an award falls into the broad
area of alleged injuries to workers' individual rights, over which arbitrators and the NLRB often have concurrent jurisdiction.15 7 The
Board long ago announced a standard for deference to arbitral
awards.' 58 Application of this standard, however, requires the Board to
sional mandate to implement national labor policy, NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 43637 (1967).
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450
U.S. 728 (1981), further delineates the deference which should be afforded arbitral awards. In
Barrentine,the Court held that an employee may sue in federal court under the Fair Labor Standards Act even after his wage claim was denied by a joint grievance committee established pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. The Court noted the "tension" between "[t]wo aspects
of national labor policy:" on the one hand, labor and management are encouraged to use the
collective bargaining process, including arbitration, as a means of voluntary dispute resolution; on
the other hand, the statutory guarantees that protect substantive employee rights must be enforced. Id at 734. The Court concluded that "[w]hile courts should defer to an arbitral decision
where the employee's claim is based on rights arising out of the collective-bargaining agreement,
different considerations apply where the employee's claim is based on rights arising out of a statute designed to provide minimum substantive guarantees to individual workers." Id at 737. The
Court also noted that arbitral awards may not adequately protect statutory rights; arbitrators may
"lack the competence" to decide complex statutory questions, id at 743, because "arbitral procedures [are] less protective of individual statutory rights than are judicial procedures," id at 744,
which also can only afford limited relief, id at 745. See also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36, 56-58 (1974).
Despite its sweeping criticism of arbitral awards, Barrentine does not necessarily imply that
no deference is due when an arbitrator decides a statutory issue. The Barrentine Court noted that
the rights at stake were individual rights, and not rights that accrue on the basis of union status.
450 U.S. at 745. See also Alexander, 415 U.S. at 49-50. Arguably, these latter rights may be fully
adjudicated by arbitrators because they pertain to the system of collective representation, even
where they also have a statutory basis. The right of employees under section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA,
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976), to be free of discriminatory discipline on the basis of their union
status, may be exactly the sort of right that would fall outside the Barrentine doctrine, see 450 U.S.
at 749-50, 752 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), or it may be construed as an individual liberty that Barrentine protects. In the latter case, the courts (and presumably the Board) decide on a case by case
basis to what extent an arbitral award deserves deference. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 60 n.21
(1974); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Marshall, 663 F.2d 1211, 1218 (3d Cir. 1981).
156. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
157. Although the exact scope of the arbitrator's jurisdiction is specified in the particular arbitration clause, see R. GORMAN, supra note 5, at 586, the general province of the arbitrator's expertise is the construction of the collective bargaining agreement. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). Strictly speaking, he may not construe labor statutes or make common law, but he may consider the contract as incorporating labor statutes, id at
597-98, and "industrial common law" (also termed the "common law of the shop"). United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960).
Unfortunately, there is often no neat division between contractual grievances and unfair labor practices (statutory violations within the jurisdiction of the NLRB). See Note, The NLRB and
Deference toArbitration, 77 YALE LJ. 1191, 1191 & nn.6-7 (1968).
158. In Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955), the NLRB ruled that it would defer to
the arbitrator's decision of the statutory issue if the arbitral proceedings were fair, if the parties
agreed to be bound by the result, and if the award was not "clearly repugnant to the purposes and
policies" of the NLRA. Id. at 1082; see also International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 929
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determine whether an award is "clearly repugnant"' 159 to the NLRA,
and the Board's repugnancy threshold has progressively lowered with
respect to awards that reach statutory issues, such as alleged violations

of section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. 160 In addition, courts must decide by

(1962), a9dsub nom. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,377 U.S. 1003 (1964)
(Board will defer unless arbitral award "palpably wrong").
There is also a fourth, but highly controversial, criterion for the Board's deferral decision. In
Monsanto Chem. Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 1097, 1099 (1961), the Board ruled that it would not defer to
an arbitrator's award if the arbitrator did not reach the statutory issue upon which the alleged
unfair labor practice was based. Thirteen years later, the Board rejected this rule on the grounds
that it encouraged multiple litigation of the same factual complaint. Electronic Reproduction
Serv. Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 758, 761-62 (1974). Within a few years, however, this new position
showed signs of erosion. See Max Factor & Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 804, 804 (1978) (Chairman Fanning and Members Murphy and Jenkins held the arbitral award repugnant to statutory policy
under Spielberg because the arbitrator failed to reach the statutory issue), enforced, 640 F.2d 197
(9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983 (1981); Mason and Dixon Lines, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 6
(1978) (Member Jenkins joined Member Murphy in disavowing Electronic Reproduction, id at 6
n.2); Kansas City Star Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 866 (1978) (Member Murphy repudiated Electronic Reproduction, id at 867 n. 1, while Chairman Fanning and Member Jenkins stated in dissent that
Spielberg is applicable only where the contract issue and the unfair labor practice issue are "congruent," id at 871 n.25). Electronic Reproduction was finally overruled in Suburban Motor
Freight, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. 146, 146 (1980), and the prior rule of Monsanto Chemical was reinstated. During this period of confusion, courts continued to apply Monsanto Chemical's fourth
criterion. See, e.g., Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535, 537-38 (9th Cir. 1977).
Very recently, there have been signs that the change in the composition of the Board may
result in still more changes in the deferral doctrine. In Professional Porter & Window Cleaning
Co., 263 N.L.R.B. No. 34 (1982), Members Fanning, Jenkins, and Zimmerman reaffirmed Suburban, id at 6, but in his dissent, Chairman Van de Water unequivocally rejected Suburban, and
also argued that the Spielberg repugnancy criterion be narrowly construed to maximize deferral.
Id at 26-27 (Chairman Van de Water, dissenting). Member Hunter took a middle ground in his
separate dissent. He would not reject Suburban "out-of-hand," id at 33, but would defer if the
contractual issue is "factually parallel" to the unfair labor practice question and the relevant facts
were presented to the arbitrator, id at 31. Member Hunter would not require the arbitrator to
follow Board precedent, id at 33, 36, so long as his award is not repugnant to the NLRA, id at 35
n.32. See also Wolff& Muries, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. No. 45 (1982) (Member Hunter "will not defer
to a grievance award that indicates on its face that statutory protections have. . . [not] been
considered." Id at 1-2 n.1). Compare Consolidation Coal Co., 263 N.L.R.B. No. 188, at 4-5 n.7
(1982) with id at 24 (Chairman Van de Water, dissenting) and id at 37-38 (Member Hunter,
dissenting).
The debate over the fourth criterion for deferral becomes even less clear when decisionmakers use different standards to determine whether an arbitrator has in fact reached the
statutory issue. Compare NLRB v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 673 F.2d 734, 736 (4th Cir. 1982) (arbitrator who ruled only on question of "just cause" for dismissal under the collective bargaining agreement held to have reached statutory issue under section 8(a)(3) because the agreement also
provided that employees could not be fired for union activities) with NLRB v. General Warehouse
Corp., 643 F.2d 965, 970 (3d Cir. 1981) (arbitrator who ruled only on question of "just cause" for
dismissal did not reach statutory issue).
159. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955).
160. Compare National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 527 (1972) with Suburban Motor Freight,
Inc. 247 N.L.R.B. 146 (1980) and General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977). See also
Consolidation Coal Co., 263 N.L.R.B. No. 188, at 3 & n.5 (1982). But see id at 38 n.37 (Member
Hunter, dissenting). See generally, NLRB v. Pincus Bros., Inc.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367, 391-94 (3d
Cir. 1980) (Gibbons, J., dissenting); Note, supra note 157 at 1191.
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what standard of review they should evaluate the Board's decision to

defer or not to defer to an arbitral award,' 6 ' and whether they will be
guided by the letter of the Board's self-imposed standard for deference

or by the liberal spirit in which the Board itself sometimes applies that
62

standard.'
If the legality of the discriminatory discipline of a union representative under section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA 163 for his participation in an
illegal strike depends on the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, the issue falls into the intersection of arbitral and administra161. The Third Circuit made much of this issue in NLRB v. Pincus Bros., Inc.-Maxwell, 620
F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1980). Judge Roserm, writing for the court, argued that the Spelberg test is a
"discretionary administrative doctrine" and that the Board's decisions on whether to defer should
therefore be reviewed under an "abuse of discretion" standard. 620 F.2d at 372 n.8. Accord
NLRB v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., No. 81-4159, slip op. at 55 & n.7 (5th Cir. Oct. 4, 1982) (citing
cases from six circuits). Judge Garth vigorously disagreed and said that the "clearly repugnant"
criterion of the Spielberg rule admits of no discretionary latitude and that therefore the Board's
deferral decisions made under that criterion should be evaluated under an "error of law" standard. Id. at 380 (Garth, J., concurring). Judge Gibbons agreed with Judge Rosenn that there was
no statutory basis for the Board's deferral policy; the policy was therefore a discretionary matter.
Id. at 388 (Gibbons, J., dissenting); accord NLRB v. Plasterers' Local Union No. 79,404 U.S. 116,
136-37 (1971).
The source of contention between Judges Roserm and Garth seems to be that the Board's
standard of deference under Spielberg is a self-imposed discretionary measure which requires an
opinion of law as to the compatibility of the arbitral award and the NLRA in its application.
Presumably, the "abuse of discretion" standard of review is higher than the "legal error" standard,
but because Judge Rosen found an abuse of discretion when Judge Garth found a legal error, the
difference in standards of review was of no ultimate consequence in Pincus Brothers.
162. This conflict is dramatically illustrated in NLRB v. PincusBros., Inc.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d
367 (3d Cir. 1980). The majority of the court followed the letter of Spielberg and held that the
arbitral award must stand even if it might be incorrect; given the need to encourage extra-legal
dispute resolution, only clearly wrong awards are unworthy of deference. See id at 374, 377
(Garth, J., concurring). The dissent pointed to the Board's recent decision in Suburban Motor
Freight, 247 N.L.R.B. 146 (1980), as evidence of the Board's intention to heighten its scrutiny
under Spielberg of arbitral awards that reach statutory issues and noted with approval a trend in
the District of Columbia Circuit to abide by the Board's decision not to defer in such cases. Pincus
Brothers, 620 F.2d at 394, 396-97 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). See Banyard v. NLRB, 505 F.2d 342,
347-49 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Local 715, International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB (Malritc of
Wisconsin), 494 F.2d 1136, 1137-38 (D.C. Cir. 1974). But see Fournelle v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 331,
341-45 (D.C. Cir. 1982). A recent Fifth Circuit case lends further support to the position of the
dissent in PincusBrothers; the court in NLRB v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., No. 81-4159, slip op.
(5th Cir. Oct. 4, 1982), held that the Board's decision not to defer should be sustained if the
decision is reasonable and is not inconsistent with congressional labor policy. Id at 57. The
PincusBrothers dissent deplored the position of the majority and that of the Ninth Circuit, see
Douglas Aircraft Co. v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 352, 355 (9th Cir. 1979); Servair, Inc. v. NLRB, 102
L.R.R.M. 2705 (9th Cir. 1979), and argued that such mandatory deference to arbitral awards robs
the Board of its jurisdiction to decide statutory issues. SeePincusBros., 620 F.2d at 398 (Gibbons,
J., dissenting). There is some indication that the Third Circuit has relaxed its position since Pincus
Brothers, see NLRB v. General Warehouse Corp., 643 F.2d 965, 969-70 (3d Cir. 1981), although
the General Warehouse court explicitly denied any inconsistency, see Id at 970 n.20.
163. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
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tive/judicial jurisdiction. The discriminatory discipline in Hammermill
PaperCo. v. NLRB t16 had been grieved to arbitration, but the Court of

Appeals for the Third Circuit held that deference to the award in favor
of the company was not required because the arbitrator did not decide
the statutory issue of whether the employer violated section 8(a)(3).16 5

In MetropolitanEdison Co. v. NLRB, 166 there was no arbitration award

in regard to the specific instance of discriminatory discipline at issue,

but there had been two earlier awards on similar occasions in the past.
The company argued that although the collective bargaining agreement

in Metropolitan was the successor to those previously construed, its language in the relevant clause was identical to that of its predecessors,
and that therefore the arbitral constructions of the earlier agreements
were entitled to precedential effect. 167 The Metropolitan court rejected
this argument, holding that it was not bound by the previous awards

because they governed only past instances of discriminatory discipline,
not the case at hand. 16 8 Thus the Court of Appeals for the Third Cir164. 658 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1981).
165. Id. at 161-62. The court held that the arbitrator addressed only the question of whether
there was just cause for the representative's discipline, that is, whether his participation in the
illegal work stoppage objectively warranted the punishment he received, rather than whether the
punishment was unduly severe and discriminatory relative to the treatment of rank-and-file participants. Id. at 162. But see NLRB v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 673 F.2d 734, 736 (4th Cir. 1982).
The Board had a different explanation for its lack of deference in Hammermill Paper Co.,
252 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1980), enforced, 658 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1981),petitionfor cert.filed, 50 U.S.L.W.
3703 (U.S. Jan. 1, 1982) (No. 81-1438). The Board concluded, as did the Third Circuit, that the
arbitrator failed to reach the statutory question, id. at 1236-37; the Board also found, however,
that the arbitrator disregarded material evidence and that the award was contrary to the NLRA.
This latter conclusion justified under the Spielberg test the Board's refusal to defer to the arbitrator's opinion. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text. By explicitly following the rule of
Monsanto Chemical, seesupra note 158, the Third Circuit avoided the question of the fairness and
legality of the arbitral proceedings. 658 F.2d at 159-60.
166. 663 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982).
167. Id. at 483. In one of the awards, the arbitrator ruled that union officials have an affirmative duty to uphold the collective bargaining agreement in the face of illegal action and that a
breach of this duty, or even participation in an illegal strike, warranted harsher punishment. Id.
168. There is a fundamental difference between deference to an arbitral award in a particular
case and giving precedential effect to an award in subsequent cases, which would impermissibly
give arbitrators the power to make common law. See supra note 157. The Metropolitan court
noted that unless the collective bargaining agreement otherwise provides, arbitrators themselves
are not bound by previous awards that construe the same agreement, because strict adherence to
precedent would hinder the flexibility of an arbitration and controvert the parties' intent to resolve
grievances on a case by case basis. 663 F.2d at 483-84. Accord NLRB v. South Cent. Bell Tel.
Co., No. 81-4159, slip op. at 58 (5th Cir. Oct. 4, 1982). The agreement at issue in Metropolitan
provided that arbitral decisions would be binding for the term of the agreement, but did not give
binding effect to decisions under previous agreements. 1d. at 484.
The Metropolitan court also held that the earlier arbitral awards concerned only the question
of just cause for the discipline and did not raise the statutory issue of a possible violation of
section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976). 663 F.2d at 483. Thus, the Metropolitan court could have followed Hammermill and based its refusal to defer on Monsanto Chemical.
See supra note 165.
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cuit has in two instances declined to give effect to an arbitral award that

would have permitted discriminatory discipline; yet in each case the
court reserved judgment on the question of whether these awards were
169
contrary to the purpose of section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.
An arbitration award on the issue of discriminatory discipline in
the context of an illegal strike is likely to uphold the legitimacy of the

discipline. The theory of negative leadership, which predicates an affirmative duty to dissuade on the union representative's status, is an
arbitral concept.1 70 As Member Penello often pointed out, it is derived

from the common law of the shop, and not from the explicit terms of
the collective bargaining agreement.1 7 1 Although the common law of

1 72
the shop is to be read into every collective bargaining agreement, it
ought not prevail when it conflicts with statutory policy as articulated

by the NLRB and the courts. Deference to these arbitral awards as

constructions of the collective bargaining agreement would resurrect
the status-based theory of responsibility in its most extreme form and
stand on their heads the current holdings of the NLRB173 and the
Courts of Appeals for the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits. Nonethe-

less, this subversion of the contract-based theory of responsibility occurred in Fournelle v. NLRB. 174
In Fournelle, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit rejected Metropolitan and held that a previous arbitration
award on a similar occasion of discriminatory discipline definitively
and bindingly construed the collective bargaining agreement to waive

the union representative's right not to be punished more severely than
the rank-and-fie for participation in an illegal strike.175 As the

Fournelle court noted, the arbitrator did not refer to any provision of
169. See Harmermill,658 F.2d at 159; MetropolitanEdison, 663 F.2d at 483 n.4. By contrast,
the administrative judge in Metropolitan Edison Co., 252 N.L.R.B. 1030 (1980), enforced, 663
F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982), applied Spielberg and held that
deference was not due the previous arbitral awards because, if made today, they probably would
be repugnant to the NLRA. Id. at 1035 (opinion of administrative judge, enforced by Board).
170. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. See also Consolidation Coal Co., 263
N.L.R.B. No. 188, at 51-53 & 51 n.70 (1982) (Member Hunter, dissenting). But see 263 N.L.R.B.
No. 188, at 15 n.17; Rummage, supra note 19 at 274-75.
171. See, eg., Gould Corp., 237 N.L.R.B. 881, 885-87 (1978) (Member Penello, dissenting),
enforcement denied, 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,449 U.S. 890 (1980). But see Consolidation Coal Co., 263 N.L.R.B. No. 188, at 41, 46 (1982) (Member Hunter, dissenting) (union
representative's duty to dissuade is inherent in the no-strike clause).
172. See supra note 157.
173. Even when it endorsed the status-based theory of implicit leadership, the Board rejected
the theory of negative leadership as an illegal predication of punishment upon union status. See
supra note 29 and accompanying text.
174. 670 F.2d 331 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
175. Id at 343-44.
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the agreement when he announced the waiver. The court, however,

termed this deficiency "irrelevant" in light of the arbitrator's power to
supplement the terms of the agreement with the common law of the

shop.' 76 The Board argued that an important protected right can only
be waived by a clear and explicit proviso; but the Fournelle court baldly
77
stated that the arbitrator's opinion was perfectly clear and explicit.
Thus, in the guise of enforcing the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement, Fournelle completely reverts to a status-based theory of re-

sponsibility. The reversion is possible within the contract-based theory
as long as an arbitrator can inject the common law of the shop into the

contract regardless of its potential conflict with statutory policy.
The effect of Fournelle was recently limited in Szewczuga v.

NLRB. 178 In Szewczuga, the court explicitly followed the current position of the Courts of Appeals for the Third and Seventh Circuits and
held that unless the collective bargaining agreement imposes on union
representatives an affirmative duty to dissuade illegal strikers, representatives who participate in a strike cannot be punished more severely

than rank-and-fie participants. 179 The Szewczuga court distinguished
Fournelle on the ground that the collective bargaining agreement in

Fournelle did impose an affirmative duty to dissuade.' 80 This distinction puts the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in a
somewhat awkward position: it will rule against discriminatory discipline except where an arbitrator has ruled that such discrimination is
8
authorized.' '

By declining to decide in Hammermill and Metropolitan whether
the arbitral awards which approved the discriminatory discipline were

repugnant to section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA,8 2 the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit weakened its position that the discipline violates sec176. Id. at 342-43 n.20.
177. Id. at 343 n.21.
178. No. 81-1054, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Aug. 17, 1982).
179. Id. at 23.
180. Id. at 14.
181. Under Szewczuga, the arbitrator's decision must also be "sufficiently clear," id at 16, and
it must be included in the administrative record, id at 15, and raised as a defense to the charge of
discriminatory discipline, id at 15-16; see, e.g., Rickel Home Centers, 262 N.L.R.B. No. 93, at 2
(1982) (deferral to an arbitral award is an affirmative defense). Although an arbitrator upheld the
discriminatory discipline of the union representatives in Szewczuga, the employer did not make
this decision part of the administrative record or raise it as a defense, and the court held that the
employer could neither introduce this issue at the appellate level nor obtain a remand of the case
for consideration of the arbitrator's decision. Szewczuga, No. 81-1054, slip op. at 15-20. According to the Szewczuga court, the arbitrator's decision that the discriminatory discipline was "'not
contrary to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement,"' id at 16 n.66 (quoting Brief
for Petitioner at 14), was not sufficient to establish a contractual waiver of the representative's
right not to be selectively punished. Id.
182. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976). See supra notes 165 & 168 and accompanying text.
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tion 8(a)(3) unless it is predicated on an explicit term of the collective
bargaining agreement. If the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
had taken a stronger stance, the Fournelle court could not have rejected
Metropolitan merely because Metropolitan holds that previous arbitration awards are not binding on subsequent questions of a similar nature. Rather, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
in Szewezuga would have been forced to acknowledge that its decision
in Fournelle flies in the face of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit's substantive analysis of the legality of discriminatory discipline
and effectively negates the trend towards a contract-based theory of responsibility. This trend began in the Third Circuit in Gould, Inc. v.
NLRB,183 gained momentum in the Seventh Circuit with C.H. Heist
Corp. v. NLRB,18 4 and culminated in Metropolitan.
IV.

CONCLUSION:

THE SUPREME COURT'S REVIEW OF

METROPOLITAN EDISON Co.

v NLRB

In the spring of 1982, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear
Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB. 185 The case presents three questions: (1) whether the NLRB and the courts may disregard clear, repeated arbitral interpretations of a collective bargaining agreement; (2)
whether union representatives have a higher duty than the rank-andfile to abide by the no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement, and if so, whether this higher duty includes the responsibility to
try to end any illegal work stoppage; and (3) whether the employer
commits an unfair labor practice if he discriminatorily disciplines a
union representative for his failure to attempt to dissuade illegal
6
strikers.18
The arguments that the various parties will make in the coming
review of Metropolitan are not difficult to predict; how the Court will
decide the issues presented, however, is much less clear.187 Given its
high regard for arbitration, the Court may be persuaded that where
contractual language remains unchanged in a series of collective bargaining agreements between the same parties, deference to an arbitrator's construction of that language should be expanded to grant
183.
184.
185.
186.

612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980).
657 F.2d 178 (7th Cir. 1981).
663 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S.Ct. 2926 (1982).
Id at 481-83.

187. The only word from the Court to date on the issue of discriminatory discipline of a union
representative for his participation in an illegal work stoppage was Justice Powells comment in a
related context that such discrimination is "arguably ... illegal." Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 421 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring in part & in the judgment).
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precedential effect. This conclusion follows a simple logic that is intuitively, but deceptively, appealing.
In Metropolitan, the arbitrator in the earlier disputes was not construing language in the collective bargaining agreement when he decided that union representatives have a higher, affirmative duty in the
context of an illegal strike. He was instead injecting into the contract
the arbitral concept of negative leadership as part of the common law
of the shop; but the NLRB has unequivocally rejected this concept as
abhorrent to the statutory policy of the NLRA. In such a case, deference to an arbitral award may be tantamount to an illegal delegation of
the Board's authority to determine a uniform national labor policy
under the NLRA. In addition, there is a vital distinction between deferring to an arbitral award in a particular case, which pays the proper
respect to the merits of voluntary, extra-legal dispute resolution, and
giving precedential effect to awards that may conflict with established
statutory policy, which raises arbitrators to judicial or administrative
stature and binds the parties in a way not at all intended in an ordinary
arbitration clause. Therefore, the Court in Metropolitan ought to temper its enthusiasm for arbitration by recognizing the inherent limitations of the arbitral process and the overriding need for a uniform
national labor policy under the jurisdiction of the NLRB and the
courts.
The statutory issue before the Court in Metropolitan is whether
discriminatory discipline of union representatives for failing to dissuade illegal strikers violates section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. This issue is
linked to the question of whether union representatives have an affirmative duty to dissuade in the absence of a contractual provision that so
specifies. This note endorses the position, most clearly articulated by
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, that union representatives
should be held to no higher level of responsibility than that negotiated
by the union and the company and explicitly set forth in the collective
bargaining agreement. To permit the employer to unilaterally create
and enforce at its own discretion a higher duty for union representatives, based on their status as such, is as unfair and capricious as it is
illegal. If such discriminatory discipline is allowed without qualification, there will be no way to monitor the motives of employers for the
antiunion animus which the Supreme Court long ago decided should
be restrained, if not purged.
At the heart of the matter lies the "lawless vacuum"1 88 created by
the absence of effective remedies for illegal work stoppages. The Court
may be persuaded that the discriminatory discipline of union repre188. Id at 423.
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sentatives for their failure to dissuade illegal strikers is the only viable
way to fill this vacuum and that when the recalcitrant union representatives participated in the stoppage, they are beyond the protection of the
NLRA. As the Courts of Appeals for the Third and Seventh Circuits
have noted, however, it may be impossible for a conscientious union
representative to wholly refrain from any degree of participation in an
illegal work stoppage and still be able to function as a mediator between the striking group and the employer. Some would say that the
union representative, as the leader of his work group, is in the best
position to instigate an illegal work stoppage, but for the same reason,
he may also be the most able to stop an illegal strike once it has occurred-unless he is forced to detach and alienate himself from the
group at the very moment when his skill as a mediator is most needed.
Of course, these practical considerations do not resolve the legal
issue. The Court should resist the temptation to evaluate the effectiveness of discriminatory discipline as a deterrent to illegal work stoppages. Even if such a remedy is thought to be more effective than not,
it ought to be bargained for by the employer or created by legislative or
administrative action. The legal issue that the Court will confront in
Metropolitan raises its own array of conflicting demands. On the one
hand, there is the established legal doctrine of withholding from all
participants in illegal strikes the statutory protections against employer
discipline. On the other hand, there is the mandate of section 8(a)(3) of
the NLRA, which unqualifiedly prohibits discriminatory discipline
based on union status. It is certainly arguable that section 8(a)(3)
should not protect rebellious representatives who engage in activities in
contravention of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. It is
equally arguable that to deny union representatives the protection of
section 8(a)(3) under any circumstances renders them vulnerable to exactly the kind of antiunion attack on individual union representatives
that the statute was created to prevent.
In a sense, tying the union representative's duty in the context of
an illegal strike to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement represents a compromise position. Where it has been bargained for, the
employer has full power to discipline union representatives who do not
discharge their duty to dissuade illegal strikers. At the same time, the
union representative is protected from arbitrary or unwarranted discipline directed at him solely on the basis of his union status. By predicating the representative's liability on the explicit terms of the
agreement, the Supreme Court can give effect to the national labor pol-
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icy that bargaining, not unilateral action, should define the rights and
responsibilities of those bound by the agreement.
Susan J. Cole

